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ABSTRACT:
While established literature defines the terms in which a hegemonic transition
would occur between great powers, it does not define the precise process. This thesis
argues that the perceptions of the rising power affects the violence levels of the transition.
The perception of hegemonic action as well as the rising power's role in the world
fundamentally affect the way in which transitions do occur. These perceptions are formed
through a knowledge of the internal intentions of the rising power which can be explored
through the history of the country, the foreign policy decision-making structure, as well
as external cues given to the hegemon. This is established through two prior examples of
hegemonic transitions as well as an analysis of the likely future transition between the
United States of America and the People's Republic of China.
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Chapter 1

-

Introduction

The rise of the People's Republic of China onto the world stage has spurred endless debate and
raised fundamental questions as to the reliability of current international relations theories. The
academic community is sharply split on the implications of a rising China (Friedburg, 2005).
Many see it as a danger to world order (Bernstein & Munro, 1 997; Nathan & Ross, 1997;
Christensen, 1999; Gries, 2004) while others claim that China is simply rising to its former post
as hegemon of Asia (Keohane, 1 984; Richardson, 1994; Johnston & Evans, 1999; Shambaugh,
1 999, 2004; Lampton, 200 I; Johnston, 2003; Goldstein, 2005).
The election of Donald Trump to the presidency of the United States has i ncreased the
need for an alternative stabilizing force in the world as the administration appears unable or
unwilling to continue to maintain its global obligations. Trump's focus on "America First"
promotes relative isolationism over the current norms of global American involvement. While at
the same time, China has begun expanding its influence. Politically, China is pushing into
regions that were traditionally under the American sphere and promoting policies that the United
States has abandoned. Economically, Trump has attempted to initiate a trade war by creating
tariffs on imported goods. Scientifically, it has begun taking the lead on climate research while
Donald Trump appointed a climate change denier in charge of the Environmental Protection
Agency.
The unassailable truth is that China is rising on many fronts, and the American political
environment is unwilling to effectively counteract. Barring accidents of history, the trends
indicate a shift in the distribution of power away from the United States and toward China at
some point during this century. The real question is what will happen when China surpasses the

2
United States on the world stage. The implications for such a transition vary from benign to
catastrophic.
Some political science scholarship suggests ihat violent conflict will erupt at some point
between the interests of the United States and China1• Prior literature points to two causal factors
for this sort of power transition: difference of power level between the two powers and the
dissatisfaction of the rising power. These assumptions are incomplete since it is possible to have
a peaceful transition (DiCicco & Levy, 1999). The explanation for such a case might rest within
the internal foreign policy decision making mechanisms within both the rising power and the
hegemon. Internal policy mechanisms coupled with the perceptions of individuals within the
system are capable of preventing or instigating violent conflict. This is a result of the nature of
power transitions being purposefully started by decision makers when they perceive the time is
appropriate. Once this decision is made, perceptions of leaders within the rising power are vital.
This thesis argues that the perceptions of the rising power influence the violence level of
hegemonic transitions. In particular, the actions of individuals within the foreign policy decision
making system can determine the actions taken by both the rising power and the hegemon. This
will be demonstrated utilizing two of the most recent power transition attempts as well as the
probable future case of China.
The remainder of this chapter will outline the literature and the methodology this thesis
will utilize. The second chapter will explore the standard cases of peaceful transition between the
United States and United Kingdom as well as the violent transition attempt by Germany in the
Second World War. The third chapter will explore the likely case of the rise of China against the
United States.

1

Notable exceptions include Mueller (2007) and Pinker (201 1).
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LITERATURE REVIEW
The literature of global order is extensive and based on broad theoretical strokes. They
are based on historical examples of power systems that have developed periodically. The goal of
explaining how these structures have emerged is to attempt to predict the future systems of the
planet. This literature review will focus on two broad theories that form the basis of this thesis:
power transition theory and foreign policy decision making processes. Other theories will be
covered briefly with an explanation as to why they are not sufficient to explain changes in the
world order.
This thesis does not utilize the theories of power balance and long cycle. Each of these
theories has serious limitations that are incompatible with the cases studied. Despite this, they are
useful as a comparative tool and to show the progress towards a more complete theory of world
order through the literature.
Power balancing assumes an ordered system that eventually balances between many
powers. Unipolar systems tend to be countered over time by the other states, though this has not
occurred since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Balancing is also subject to differences in
definition. As such, it does not provide a stable view of the world.
I n a similar sense, long cycle theory limits itself to adapting other theories into a cyclical
world h istory based on hegemons rising then being crushed by opposition in regular predictable
patterns. It made strong predictions about the downfall of the United States following I 973 that
has not come to fruition. It also focused on hegemons as innovators rather than military powers.
Power transition shows the most promise but is rooted in realist assumptions of state
behavior that simply do not prove accurate in practice. While many of its assumptions provide a
complete picture for the world order, complex interdependency blocks pure power-based state
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interests. The main area of objection is the violent roots of power transition itself. While wars are
quite common, hegemonic wars are, by definition, extensive and radically change the political
environment afterwards (Gilpin, 1 98 1 ; 1 988). Violence does not always occur during transitions
and the level of violence that does is mitigated by individual actors within the state.
POWER BALANCING

Power balancing theory was originally developed by Waltz and is based within the realist
school. lt argues that anarchical international systems develop stability over time due to a
relatively equal distribution of power among states (Waltz, 1 979). When one state accumulates
more power than others, the other states in the system tend to band together in order to
counterbalance the powerful state or individually develop their resources to counter the state.
This is accomplished through the mechanism of self-help.
One of the many serious issues with this theory is the definition of balancing. SchweIler
(2006), Wohlforth, et al. (2007), and Paul, et al. (2004) each have separate definitions that range
from hard to soft. I n his wide-ranging analysis of the theory, Paul, et al. (2004) provides for the
distinction between three types: hard balancing, soft balancing, and asymmetric balancing that
allow for a broad range of activities to be considered balancing.
Schweller argues for the nature of hard balancing. "[B]alancing exists only when the
stakes concern some form of political subjugation or, more directly, the seizure of territory,
wither one's homeland or vital interests abroad . . . Balancing requires that the states target their
military hardware at each other in preparation for a potential war" (Schweller, 2006, p. 9). This
form of hard balancing can be expanded to include preventing the emergence of a hegemon or
undermining its position (Paul, et al., 2004, p. 3). There is no middle ground for diplomatic
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efforts, as even peaceful efforts rely on the threat of military force to bring negotiators to the
table.
Asymmetric balancing involves the utilization of non-military resources to balance
against indirect external or internal threats. This can be expanded to include efforts by
subnational units or groups to weaken state actors through subversive means such as terrorism
(Paul, et al. 2004, p. 16-1 7). According to Nexon, this is similar to David's theory of
omnibalancing that allows for weak regimes to balance between internal and external threats
(David, 1991 ). This allows for a better understanding of alliance policies rather than simply
examining foreign relations (Nexon, 2009, p. 341).
Soft balancing "involves tacit balancing short of formal alliances. It occurs when states
generally develop ententes or limited security understandings with one another to balance a
potentially threatening state or rising power" (Paul, et al; 2004, p. 3). These may include regional
training programs, limited arms buildup, and mutual cooperation on other issues. They also have
the ability to transform into hard balancing policies should the external threat become more
substantive.
This type of balancing has been criticized for including activities outside of military
involvement (Wohlforth, 2004), but as Nexon (2009, p. 343) argues, even the strictest definition
of state coercion involves many activities outside of military force (see the definition of soft
power, discussed in Nye, 2004). Critiques over the definition of balancing has led to an academic
call to eliminate the theory all together or adapt it to a much broader definition (Wohlforth, et al.
2004; Nexon, 2009) while others have defended the theory as justified and useful in its current
form. (Paul, et. al., 2004; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2009). Schroeder ( 1 994) provides a thorough
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critique of power balancing theory as a whole. Through a historians' perspective, he argues that
the assumptions put forth by power balance theorists cannot be supported by historical fact.
The first assumption is that states seek self-help against threats by acting on their own
(see prior discussion of Waltz). Instead of focusing entirely on self-help, European states had
multiple forms of responses to serious threats that would cost too much to mitigate on their own.
States had the option of either "hiding" from threats through neutrality, taking a defensive
position, or allying with one side of a conflict; "transcending" the risk by developing an
institutional constraint on the actors to prevent a recurrence; bandwagoning by allying with the
stronger side (Walt, 1 985); or acting on their own through self-help as a rarely used backup to
more successful policies (Schroeder, 1 994, p. l 1 7).
The other primary assumption of power balancing is that only the relative power of
individual states determines their role and status in the system. Schroeder argues that power is
not important to roles. Specialization can be produced willingly by states through either
historical accident or willing policy by leaders. States are capable of specializing in a certain role
while other states accept this role (p. 1 24). These roles were rarely created through security
arrangements, but instead were only loosely related to the security of the state (p. 1 27).
Foreign policies were directly affected by these roles as well. Schroeder argues that the
Hapsburg Empire best exemplifies this idea. While many of its functions and roles were security
related, such as maintaining the post-Napoleonic Vienna balance, it also kept the pre-nationalist
groups suppressed within its borders (p. 128). If they were able to develop their identities, the
system would collapse and broad forces of racial identity would reshape Europe once again.
The example of the Hapsburgs provides abundant evidence that power alone does not
determine roles. The more important factor is the special requirements of individual states which

7
collectively agreed to develop a stable regime with specialized roles and functions that ensured
peace for decades. Without stable assumptions that work with prior examples, the balance theory
is incapable of explaining future events.
Other scholars have noted the non-falsifiability of the theories of balancing behavior
(Lakatos, 1970; Vasquez, 1 997) and the multiplicity of theories that scholars can utilize in their
search for an explanation (Schweller, 1 997). These explanations also extend away from pure
balancing behavior into other actions by states such as bandwagoning (Waltz, 1 979; Walt, 1987;
Schweller, 1 997), buck-passing, and chain-gaining (Christensen & Snyder, 1 990), among others.
The inability for balancing theory to explain a majority of interstate interactions without
relying on an expansion of the original theory is troubling. It may be that European systems were
unique in their level of cooperation and lack of formal balancing behavior. This is unlike due to
the histories of other regions. East Asia has almost always been dominated by a Chinese state
with bordering states paying tribute to the central empire that never balanced against it (Mosher,
2000). Even the rise of Japan did not see balancing behavior towards the Chinese empire. Islam
unified the Arab world into one state for a substantial period. lnfighting only emerged after the
state was shattered by foreign invasion. Despite this, no balancing behavior existed up through
the fall of the Ottoman Empire.
Scholars tend to focus on European systems for the sole reason that the arena was
complicated enough and provides enough examples to experiment with different explanations of
state behavior. A relatively small territory with numerous competing actors is a perfect area for
international relations scholarship.
The theory provides no explanations for complicated decisions of foreign policy by
decision makers nor has it been able to explain peaceful transitions of hegemonic power
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throughout history. Historical analysis by various scholars shows that major conflicts within
Europe had limited balancing behavior unless they were physically attacked, as in the case of
Napoleon (Vasquez 1997, p. 908; Rosecrance & Lo, 1987). These realities prevent this theory
from being used to effectively explain hegemonic transition.
LONG CYCLE

Long cycle theory makes the assumption that history repeats itself over a set timetable.
Modelski argues that a periodic hegemonic war produces a world leader who presides over the
international system for a certain period. This leader will establish the rules of the world order
but will eventually collapse because of "deconcentration" of power (Modelski, 1978).
His theory sees five distinct cycles of power since 1494. Each cycle is broken into three
phases that last approximately one hundred years apiece. For clarity of description, they are
displayed in Table 1.
The leadership cycles described by Modelski are based on those states that provide
innovation in methods and modes ofbehavior rather than military or economic strength. This is
why the challenger never becomes the leader at the end of the conflict. The transfer of power is
always peaceful, albeit motivated by global conflict. The peace is rooted in becoming a large
naval power that limits conflict as well as the political structure being composed of two political
parties that necessitate political compromise instead of outward aggression (Modelski, 1978).
Since this theory was established in the middle of the Cold War and the Soviet Union was
not seen as weak enough to collapse, this theory has lost much of its legitimacy of prediction.
Global war has not occurred despite more than two decades since the collapse of political
communism and no state seems close enough to challenge the United States on any military,
economic, or innovative front. It seems that global conditions might have eliminated the need for
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Table

I: Mode/ski's Five Cycles ofleadership
Global War Phase

I . 1494-1516
France is the challenger during Italian and
Indian Ocean Wars

World Power Phase
1516-1540

Phases ofDelegitimization
and Deconcentration
1540-1580

Portugal is leader

2. 1580-1609

1609-1640

Spain is the challenger during Spanish-Dutch
wars

Netherlands is leader

3.1688-1713

1714-1740

France is the challenger during wars of Louis

Britain is leader

1640-1688

1740-1792

XIV

4.1792-1815

1815-1850

France is the challenger again during
Revolutionaryand Napoleonic wars

Britain is leader again

5. 1914-1945

1945-1973

1850-1914

1973-?

Germany challenges duringWorld Wars
United States is leader
Source: Rosecrance, R. ( 1987). Review: Long Cycle Theory and International Relations. International
Organization, 41(2) p. 288.

a hegemonic war to motivate changes. Nuclear weapons, mass communication, and the
entrenched institutionalization of the post-WWII economic system have seemingly eliminated
the ability for a challenger to push against the current leader.
Seeming to lack an answer to this critique, Modelski ( 1987) is neutral on when and how a
hegemonic war will occur in each cycle and even claims that a peaceful transition is possible
without a global conflict. Rosecrance ( 1987) argues that a lack of a causal variable for
hegemonic war is difficult to explain away, especially when the hegemon chosen is by no means
the most powerful actor (p. 296). There must be some form of causal mechanism to establish a
new hegemon. The value placed on legitimacy is also criticized. Being a legitimate power is by
no means enough to maintain a certain type of order. Jn a similar vein, innovative ideas can and
will be copied by rivals thus eliminating the hegemon's ability to continue its role over an
extended period.
Long cycle provides limited benefit to the cases explored in this thesis. While it does
provide a unique way of explaining why certain states become relatively powerful over others, it
does not provide a convincing view of hegemonic displacement or creation due to its
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fundamental assumption that all major wars are hegemonic in nature. According to Rosecrance
,,
( 1987): "cycles of warfare do not correlate with cycles of leadership (p. 296). Wars can occur
during a hegemon's apogee of power. In a similar line, peaceful transition is possible between
leaderships as evidenced by the creation of new orders by states not involved in the prior
hegemonic conflict.
POWER TRANSITION

Power transition theory was originally developed by Organski and argues that states are
organized around a four-tiered hierarchy based on collections of political, military, and economic
power. Hegemons are the peak of this system. They are capable of affecting the domestic and
foreign policies of other states through their influence. They also generally set up institutions that
assist in guaranteeing their power. The secondary powers are great powers that assist in
maintaining the system through their influence and are also potential rivals if the dominate
hegemon begins to weaken. These states have hegemonic influence within their regions but are
incapable of directly challenging the hegemon. The third-tier states are middle powers capable of
spreading limited influence on a regional level while the fourth tier are the remaining states that
have no influence over others (Organski, 1958).
The stability of this system is ensured by the presence and influence of the hegemon. The
lack of financial or political leadership in the state system tends to increase the chances of
conflict as the world reverts to an anarchic system in search of order (Organaki & Kugler, 1980).
This stability is produced by the production of a public good whether it be free trade or security
arrangements against broad threats (Snidal, 1985, p. 58 l ). The presence of a powerful actor
allows for a stable regime of free trade and the creation of institutions that maintain the system.
Smaller states tend to benefit by not being required to assist in the security of trade systems
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while the hegemon extracts benefits of cooperation and business interests being drawn to its
central market. This system has been criticized by some scholars since it argues that all states
must enjoy the benefits of the regime in order to not feel chafef d by the hegemon (Snidal, 1985).
Power transition occurs when one or more of the secondary powers directly challenges
the hegemon and succeeds. These rising powers are states which "have grown to full power after
the existing international order was fully established and the benefits already allocated"
(Organski & Kugler, 1980; p. 19). If the hegemon is unwilling or unable to adapt to the demands
of the dissatisfied power, then the state will attempt to make its own rules by overthrowing the
system. This attempt tends to be violent and generally takes the form of a hegemonic war. Gilpin
argues that hegemonic wars will occur when: "the differential growth of power in a state system
would undermine the status quo" ( 1988; p. 596).
Gilpin argues that: "A hegemonic war generally involves all of the states in the system; it
is a world war. Whatever the immediate and conscious motives of the combatants ... the
fundamental issues to be decided are the leadership and structure of the international
system ... Such wars are at once political, economic, and ideological struggles. Because of the
scope of the war and the importance of the issues to be decided, the means employed are usually
unlimited. Jn Clausewitzian terms, they become pure conflicts or clashes of society rather than
the pursuit of limited policy objectives" (p. 600-60 l ). The ultimate end result of hegemonic wars
is a change in the fundamental order of the system. How exactly these changes will occur are
unpredictable due to the nature of policy makers in crises to decide policies based on immediate
needs.
Following a hegemonic war, the victors will construct a new system that stabilizes the
world order as well as prevents a similar war from occurring. The United States constructed a
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comprehensive financial system, an international forum for solving global issues, and created a
solid military alliance with the defeated challengers following World War II. Great Britain
developed a global trading regime and excluded those that violated it. The ancient Romans
conquered the known world and accepted former enemies into their ranks in order to instill their
values into other cultures. These examples highlight just some of the mechanisms that secure a
hegemon 's power.
There are several reasons why conflict would probably not erupt in a modern period
during a power transition. The first is obvious: nuclear weapons. Any form of major conflict
between two great powers is bound to involve the utilization of their nuclear arsenals. The
devastation on both sides of the war would result in no clear victor and the ultimate point of the
conflict is eliminated. The conception of mutually-assured-destruction may not be enough to
prevent nuclear weapons from being used. Despite this, nuclear weapons have a solid taboo on
their use decreasing the likelihood of initial assault by nuclear weapons (Tannenwald, 1999). It is
worth noting that the taboo has not been tested in an environment of sustained conflict between
two nuclear powers.
The second core reason war is unlikely is the entrenched nature of the current
international institutions and organization. The United States set up the system in order to
maintain its own power but allowed some processes for change in order. The rules and
regulations currently in place could theoretically allow a group of great powers to take the place
of an American-based unipolar system (Kupchan, et aJ, 200 I). No matter the formal changes in
global order and barring some unforeseeable collapse of the American state, the United States
will retain a strong position in the global order for at least another century.
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Any state wishing to challenge this system will have to eliminate it entirely and replace it
with something equally beneficial to weaker states. This monumental task was accomplished by
the United States and its allies following one of the most destructive wars in human history. Any
challenger wishing to replace the current system will be forced to win a war of even greater
proportions. The most likely route will be to work within the system to shift the leadership
position away from the United States and towards a rising power. I n order to change the game, a
state must play the game.
Power transition assumes that hegemonic war is the only outcome of power parity
between a rising state and a hegemon. The theory argues that power will inevitably become
unequal due to accidents of history or concerted efforts within states. Despite these assumptions,
there have been cases of peaceful transition including from the U nited Kingdom to the United
States i n the late 1 800s. There have also been very destructive wars involving many world actors
that did not result in a hegemonic transition.
Lebow & Valentino (2009) provide a rare critique of the fundamental assumptions of
power transition theory while also providing straightforward answers to explain these issues.
Barring their technical critiques for definitions of rising powers and hegemons, they find little
evidence of proper hegemons in the European system (Kaufman, Little, & Wohl forth, 2007).
Powerful states have been unable to coerce other states into following their nonns. Hegemonies
are rooted in colonization of other cultures. This runs counter to traditional theory which argues
that other great powers are controlled by the hegemon. They argue that "negotiated compromises
between multiple powers" (emphasis in original text) are more likely than hegemonic control of a
region (p. 393).
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DiCicco and Levy ( 1999) also provide a theoretical opening for further analysis. Through
a Lakato methodology of scientific research programs, they find a series of core arguments as
well as positive heuristics that can be utilized to support the core arguments. One of these
incorporates "mitigating factors such as the challenger's potential, the speed of the challenger's
rise, the dominant power's flexibility, and friendly relations between the dominant power and the
challenger" (p. 688). DiCicco and Levy go on to demonstrate that each of these factors are weak
or otherwise difficult to analyze. This provides an opening for further analysis with
unconventional ideas.
These difficulties show strong weaknesses with the power transition theory. As this thesis
argues below, the variables missing from power transition theory are rooted in the perceptions of
the rising power against the hegemon. Perceptions are formed through individual leaders and
foreign policy decision makers as well as history and cultural norms.
FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONMAKING

The decision to carry out a hegemonic war does not come about by accident. internal
policy makers must decide whether to attempt a power transition. Military growth, economic
policies that expand the power of the state's currency and trading resources, and political policies
to create an alliance system are examples of actions used in order to develop a more powerful
state.
These concerted efforts are fueled by the internal policy making mechanisms within the
government. The structure of the decision-making system is a determining factor of foreign
policy decision making. An executive has the· choice of how to effectively gather information,
provide analysis, and direct internal debate over issues (Renshon & Renshon, 2008, p. 5 18). How
this gets accomplished depends on the process utilized.
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A large amount of literature seeks to explain foreign policy decision making. The field
was originally explored by a variety of scholars in the mid-l 960s2. They provided the argument
that the environment of decision makers affects foreign policy outcomes. Instead of simple
balancing behavior or assuming black boxes, states have individual members capable of
influencing foreign policy. As with any attempt to explore a complicated situation, the literature
has developed into numerous branches of study.
Rational choice assumes that "nations are led by rational, forward-looking, expected
utility-maximizing leaders" (Mesquita & Lalman, 1990, p. 751). lt also assumes that rationality
is predisposed towards the maintenance of the domestic status quo, namely continuance in office
(Mintz & DeRouen, 2010, p. 59). Because of this, the decisions made may not lead to the best
outcome (p. 58). Other scholars have noted that this logic may only be "bounded" insofar as the
environment in which decisions are made prevent every possible option from being considered
(Simon, 1955 & March, 1984).
Building on other concepts, poliheuristic theory argues that decision makers utilize
mechanisms to simplify complex foreign policy decisions (Mintz, et al, 1997). This is generally
accomplished in two stages. A filtering mechanism eliminates the options that are unreasonable
to the state and a cost-benefit analysis narrows the field to the most economical solution (Mintz,
et al, 1997). This field also notes the political aspect ofdecision making and has provided a
perspective on multiple foreign policy decisions (Freedman & Karsh, 1991; Taylor-Robinson &
Redd, 2003; DeRouen, 2003; James & Zhang, 2005; Redd, 2005).
Bureaucratic systems assume that a group of individual organizations proposing ideas
that benefit their vested interests will influence policy. Based on Allison's I972 analysis of the

2 See Hudson (2005) for an overview this history.
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Cuban Missile Crisis, this branch argues that leaders will arrive at policy ideas through a series
of bargaining games. These games are institutionalized within the system with preselected actors
and processes. This bargaining behavior is rooted in achieving the most influence (Allison &
Halperin, 1972). Actors within these games tend to promote well defined organizational
preferences (Drezner, 2000).
While conflict is inherent between these groups (Mitchell, 2005), representatives tend to
act outside of the formal process in order to achieve their goals, e.g. salami tactics, leaking, and
coercion, among others (Moaz, 1990; Garrison, 1999). While this field of study has been
criticized (Krasner, 1972; Caldwell, 1977; Kasza, 1987), it has provided a relatively accurate
view of foreign pol icy decisions within democratic systems (Smith, 1984; Hollis & Smith, 1986).
These theories do little to interpret the tough decisions foreign policy decision makers
must take outside of crisis situations. They all provide a reasonable analysis of normal foreign
policy decisions, but decision makers are long-term thinkers or grand strategists. Deciding
whether to attempt a power transition can be as simple as stopping a naval vessel for a routine
inspection or as dramatic as launching a preemptive nuclear strike.
ARGUMENT

The prior literature on power transition can be placed into a simple framework based on
the two causal factors of power transition theory: the level of parity with a hegemon as well as
the satisfaction of the rising power. This is shown in Table 2. Once a state reaches power parity
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with a hegemon, it must be satisfied with the current order to prevent a violent confrontation and
a transition attempt. The prior literature assumes structural conditions explain violent hegemonic
conflict. If violence (or lack thereof) cannot be explained, power transition theory allows for
mitigating factors to explain this rise (DiCicco & Levy, 1999). This thesis utilizes one such
mitigating factor: perceptions.
Perceptions of individual actors within a system are a critical part of any analysis of
foreign policy decision making. The most critical act of any state is the decision to undertake a
hegemonic power transition against an already existing regime. To this end, the perceptions of
those actors would determine the direction this policy would take.
Two distinct types of perception determine the level of violence shown during a
transition. These are based on the perceptions of the rising power. The perception towards
hegemonic action highlights distinct levels of trust. The perception towards the rising power's
current role in the world highlights the level of satisfaction with global order. Trust of the
hegemon and the status of the global order are the fundamental blocks of foreign policy for the
rising power. These perceptions are determined by the internal foreign policy decision making
system as well as cultural history, the political system, and external cues. This thesis will work
under the assumption that power parity has been achieved and the rising power is dissatisfied.
A framework is presented in Table 3 that outlines four distinct outcomes that result from
a combination of two dichotomous factors: the rising power's view of hegemonic action and the
rising power's view of their current role in the hegemonic system. Focusing on the rising power
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as the independent variable is useful since hegemons are expected to act in a rational self-interest
in order to preserve their reign. Rising powers have much greater flexibility in their actions and
more variance in their perceptions of the world3. In this light, the violence level of the hegemonic
shift itself is the dependent variable. It can range from completely peaceful to massively violent.
It is also worth noting that the transition may not even occur depending on outside political
factors or accidents of history.
Each of these factors requires an understanding of internal intentions of the state.
Determining these intentions is a difficult prospect (Yarhi-Milo 2013; Rosato, 2014). Both the
hegemon and the rising power must be capable of looking inside the other actor to determine
policy goals and attitudes. To this end, this thesis argues that three distinct factors can lead to a
reasonable understanding of the intentions of other states. These are I ) the history and cultural
heritage of the state, 2) the political system, and 3) external cues made in international
organizations or with their actions towards other states. The first two are readily understood by
intelligence systems while the latter relies upon individual experts or leaders within the
diplomatic corps. The nuances of these factors are expanded in Table 4.

3

This is counter to a majority ofpower transition literature (Organski,

1958, p. 334-37), which indicates a hegemon

would maintain a much more flexible foreign policy compared to the rising power in an attempt to ensure its rule.
This thesis assumes a hegemon must utilize a majority ofits resources maintaining the international order rather than
attempt to stop a rising power's challenge.
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Heritage can determine the basis of how states see each other, how world order is
supposed to be structured, etc. The political system determines how outside interests can shape
the intentions of a single leader or provide cover for his deception. Actions include arms
purchases, withholding certain votes in the UN, or slipping a note while at a meeting. Focusing
on actions allows for a focus on foreign policy decision making processes.
METHODOLOGY
The system explored within the literature review provides a general framework for
understanding the power transition system. This methodology section will fill in the details of the
concepts laid out in the argument. This section includes a list of definitions, an expanded
explanation of the adapted power transition framework, the definition of the independent
variables, and the implications of each quadrant.
DEFINITIONS

Definitions of terms such as "hegemon" and "power" are sometimes host to a litany of
debate among academic researchers. There is no set definition for the concepts being discussed
within this thesis, especially when comparing different time periods. Despite this fact, it is
important to define certain parameters, sometimes arbitrarily, in order to best explore the
processes at work in power transition.
Whether the strength of the state emerges from military capacity (De Soysa, et al., 1997)
or economic production (Organski & Kugler, 1980; Lebow & Valentino, 2009), the definition of
power is critical to determining when a transition occurs. Military strength tends to
overemphasize the role of defense in determining power structures and rarely indicate the ability
to dictate policy to other states. Economic measures, if properly done, are capable of showing
relative strength. Raw figures such as gross national product are poor indicators of power,
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especially when not controlling for population and economic developmental factors. Other
measures such as membership in international organizations or legitimacy are far too vague to be
compared over time and rarely highlight hegemonic tendencies. The definition of power within
this thesis is the capacity of a rising power to instigate a hegemonic transition. This allows for
flexibility for when rising powers have an inadequately developed economy, military, or culture.
It also allows for a perspective where the state perceives itself as superior to the hegemon.
For the purposes of this thesis, a hegemon is defined as a state that has two distinct
attributes. It must be one of the most powerful states in the system by most objective
measurements, including but not limited to military strength, economic capacity, and cultural
dominance. It must also be the lynchpin or founder of a regional or global system of norms. This
can include a trade regime dominated by a single state-controlled company, institutions that
regulate economic activities between states, and an overarching level of governance with the
hegemon as a powerful player. A rising power is a state that is growing economically and
militarily to parity with the hegemon as well as attempting to gain more influence within the
current global order, especially with rival norms. This definition allows for additional flexibility
for states that would otherwise not be equivalent in strength to hegemons to challenge the overall
power structure.
Hegemonic action is how the state orders the system and what benefits it provides to its
members. Stability, free trade, international forums, and military protection are just some
benefits. Taxes, tributes, loss of sovereignty, and forced acceptance of foreign norms are just
some examples of the costs of order.
There can also be more than one hegemonic system in the world at a time. Due to the vast
nature of the planet, especially prior to modern transportation systems, multiple polarities can
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form each with a surrounding system of loyal states. To this end, hegemonic transition can
simply be a transfer of leadership from one state to another of an existing system, a redesign of
the global order to better fit the rising power's needs, or even a splitting of an existing order
between two powers. This thesis makes little distinction between these options, as the end result
is the same: one rising power becomes more powerful than the existing hegemon in the system.
These definitions allow for a clearer picture of the roots of violence within power
transitions. Violent tendencies of states that are normally considered dissatisfied can be tempered
with the perceptions of the policymakers within a rising power. These perceptions fundamentally
transform the actions of the state and have the ability to influence decision makers within the
hegemon. Internal pressures are also capable of changing policy, especially within a democratic
system. Policymakers may find themselves under threat of electoral defeat or popular overthrow
if certain policies are not changed relating to a hegemon.
The view of hegemonic action is equivalent to the measure of satisfaction used within
power transition literature. It measures the overall trends of public opinion or individual leader
opinion about the policies and objectives of the hegemon. The view of the rising power's current
role measures the broad policy objectives of the rising power. Whether the views are positive or
negative affect the violence level of transitions. Historical events and reactions of the hegemon
are also capable of influencing what course of action the rising power will seek. These actions
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are likely to affect the perceptions of the rising power as well. Therefore, this is not a one-cycle
game but is based on repeated iterations of interaction.
For simplicity and clarity, the independent variables are operationalized by the terms
positive and negative. Positive feelings towards hegemonic actions would imply cooperation
between the rising power and the hegemon. Coordination with intergovernmental organizations
or military alliances is useful indicators of positive views ofhegemon. Negative feelings towards
hegemonic actions imply harsh rhetoric and even harsher actions against their interests in the
region. Funneling materials and money to insurgent groups around the world is a solid sign of
distrust as is maintaining a separate financial system from the hegemonic system. It is also
possible to have a mixture of both occurring simultaneously. The way in which the rising power
balances these agendas determine the feeling towards hegemonic action. The balance tends to be
based on historical circumstances and prior interactions on divisive issues.
Positive feelings on the rising power's place in the world order are the equivalent to
satisfied power. The rising state is unlikely to directly challenge the hegemon over many
controversial issues. There would still be negotiations and pressure over issues that are of vital
importance to the rising power and accommodations would be likely. The broad goals of content
powers only involve accommodation and cooperation with the hegemonic order. ln this case, the
rising power believes the leadership of the current order is satisfactory and has no plans to
change it towards any idealistic goals.
Negative feelings imply opposite trends. Discontented powers will work against the
hegemonic order and will most likely attempt to break it down in lieu of their own system. The
rising power would most likely ally itself with states not within the hegemonic order to attempt
to counter the influence of the hegemon as well as to further strengthen economic and cultural
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strength. Broad policy objectives are likely to involve the removal of restrictive rules through a
mixture of diplomacy and sheer political and economic pressure. The level of appeasement
required to make a rising power satisfied is dependent upon the individual leaders within the
rising power and their perceptions of the situation. The definitions of positive and negative are
left intentionally vague in order to provide flexibility under differing historical circumstances.
The goal of any rising power is to limit the expenditure of resources in order to gain
additional power. Since hegemony is difficult to maintain, the rising power is unlikely to want to
use force to gain its power, though it will use it if necessary. With the opposite logic, the
hegemon must balance between the use of resources to block the ascendance of the rising power
and the maintenance of its current order (DiCicco & Levy, l 999, p. 688). A violent transition
attempt is the least desirable option for both the hegemon and the rising power. Despite this
logic, hegemonic wars do occur periodically and are based purely of missteps by both sides that
fuel negative perceptions.
A vast majority of scholarly literature fits well into one of the four quadrants. While the
framework focuses on the end result, the journey to the quadrant is important as well. It is
possible to transfer between the four quadrants based on the reaction of the hegemon towards the
actions of the rising powers. Thus, this framework is not simply a one-time event; it develops
over time as both sides realize what is occurring. Each side reacts to the trends, and this in and of
itself shapes the end resu It.
As shown in Table 3, the framework provides four distinct outcomes to an attempted
power transition. Peaceful transitions are relatively rare and involve mutual understanding of the
hegemon and the rising power. Hegemonic war is the classic case of destructive conflict that
devastates both parties but a victor emerges with a new hegemonic order. Adaptive transition
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sees a middle ground between the two extremes. There is likely to be some tensions and possibly
some minor direct conflict but eventually a forced accommodation will be made between the
rising power and the hegemon. A change in polarity is incredibly unlikely since negative feelings
towards a hegemon and a positive feeling of the world order tends to quickly redirect towards
dissatisfaction with a current role.
PEACEFUL TRANSITION

If a rising power has a positive view on both categories, then the outcome will be a peaceful
transition of power or an enmeshment of the rising power into the current global order. Which of
these occurs is dependent on multiple political factors that fall outside the purview of this thesis.
The scholarly study of peaceful transitions is rather weak since, by definition, the lack of
a war is a nonevent. Kupchan, Adler, Coicaud, and Khong (200 1) argue that peaceful power
transition occurs when a rising power and a hegemon have "benign images" of each other. After
a mutual understanding is developed, both states must agree on the new international order as
well as legitimize this new order for other states within the system. One of the few cases of a
peaceful transition emerged in the late l 91h Century with the transition between the United
Kingdom and the United States. This case will be explored in greater detail in the second
chapter.
There are two distinct end results from an attempted peaceful transition. First, the
leadership role could transfer to a new state. This would be considered a successful transition.
The new hegemon would establish a new order with the former hegemon closely connected. The
other end result is a failed power transition where the status quo is maintained but the rising
power remains friendly with the hegemon. Failed transitions of this type are likely to lead to a
successful adaptive transition.

25
HEGEMONIC WAR

Distrust of hegemonic action and dislike of role is likely to result in a classic hegemonic war.
Utilizing Gilpin's theory, this thesis assumes that hegemonic conflicts will be devastating and
will result in a reshuffling of global order. Even failed hegemonic transitions will provide
incentive for the hegemon to recreate its order by reinforcing alliances as well as establishing an
economic or military system of deterrence to other rivals.
Multiple cases throughout history have shown the hegemonic war narrative to be
relatively accurate. Wars such as the Thirty Years War (16 18-1648), the Napoleonic Wars
( 1803- l 8 l 5), and the Anglo-Dutch Wars ( 1648- 1 8 10) are used as examples of hegemonic wars,
since they meet the criteria for transfers of military and economic power (Gilpin 1988, p. 6066 1 0). A modern example of hegemonic war is the European theater of World War II where
Germany attempted to overthrow the post-Great War US-centric hegemonic order. This case will
be explored in more detail in the second chapter.
The traditional form of violent transition has become implausible due to the development
of nuclear weapons. Despite this, a heavy conventional armed conflict in modern times would be
devastating regardless of the utilization of nuclear weapons. With current American involvement
in a complicated alliance system spanning most of the planet, any potential challenger would
have to contend with a global effort to defeat the current system.
ADAPTIVE TRANSITION

If a rising power has a positive view of hegemonic action but a negative view of their role in the
world, the end result should be a form of adaptive power transition. This process will see a rising
power adapting the current international institutions to meet their own policy goals. There is no
need to create alternative institutions as the current ones are quite capable of spreading the rising
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power's form of order. In this regard, there is little need to overthrow the existing order, as the
rising power is satisfied with the leadership of the hegemon.
Unlike peaceful transition, there will be tension between the rising and hegemonic
powers but should not involve a hegemonic-level conflict. A perception of not being taken
seriously by the hegemon despite their positive views might result in certain tense situations that
could degrade into limited conflict. Sensitive issues perceived to be critical to security and
situational deferment of leadership in particular arenas are prone to this sort of boisterousness.
This thesis argues that the future likely Chinese transition is a candidate for this sort of transition
against the United States. The details of this argument will be elaborated within the third chapter.
CHANGE IN POLARITY

If a rising power has a negative view of hegemonic action but is satisfied with their role
in the world, the result will be a change in polarity, whether it is the formation of a regional
hegemony or a bipolar system. The rising power believes a different power can run the current
system better than the hegemon but does not wish or is unable to change its global position.
Organizations that rival the functions of the existing order would be developed to maintain the
material benefits of being a rising power without the responsibilities of maintaining the world
order.
Changes in polarity are rare and are not technically transition events as the hegemon
remains in power. The only notable example that did not degrade into hegemonic conflict is
development of a bipolar order between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and
United States in the late 1940s. This case is special due to its origins following a separate
hegemonic war as well as the role of nuclear weapons and will not be used as a case study due to
the complicated origin of the polarity shift.
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Any other case where a transition shift seemed plausible failed due to the rising power
becoming dissatisfied with the role in the world system when their attempts to become more
powerful were rebuffed or the development of a rival system failed. The dislike of hegemonic
action nearly guarantees this eventual slide into hegemonic war. Barring a sudden process of
trust-building, polarity shifts remain unlikely to occur in the future.
INTERAL FACTORS

The selection of positive or negative perceptions of causal factors is rooted in three
separate factors that are determined by internal foreign policy decision makers. These are the
history and cultural heritage of the state, the political system, and external cues made in
international organizations or with their actions towards other states. Each provides competing
influences on the decision makers and the end result will be determined by a combination of the
three. Since every situation and state is unique, this provides enough interpretive room to explore
the nuances of the institutional variables within the government.
The history and heritage of the state is the combination of cultural milieu and historical
precedent set by prior interactions with major powers. Even if the hegemon had had little contact
with the rising power, their history may still be filled with examples of great powers conquering
or destroying the countryside. Culturally, a state may have a h istory of maintaining its own
civilization for a period of hundreds to thousands of years. This sort of history would imply a
negative relationship with great powers as well as a psychological need to maintain power
structures independent of outside i n fluence. A state with little cultural heritage and a relatively
friendly history with foreign powers may imply a sol idly positive view of great powers and a
stable order.
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The influence of the political system on foreign policy varies depending on system, time
period, and the personalities of leadership. Factors such

as

public opinion, the role of the

military, bureaucratic structure, and strength of the head of the government all determine how
and why decisions are made. States with democratic values are heavily influenced by public
opinion and the competing interests of individual representatives. Foreign policy decision
making in these cases tend to be moderate, and strong stances on non-critical issues are rare and
depend on the public's mood. Authoritarian systems are based in personality of the leader more
than traditional diplomatic discussions. These cases are relatively predictable, especially if the
psychology of the leader is well-understood.
The middle grouping of semi-authoritarian or communist foreign policy shows a bit of
variation. Some cases have a level of public input while many cases do not. The decision makers
are bureaucrats and maintain their own vested interests and perceptions on the world view.
Individuals are much more important to the overall process since there is rarely a single leader
that makes final decisions.
External cues are a form of diplomacy between high level actors who are unwilling or

unable to directly communicate to one another. This is the process of "back channels" that are a
stable feature of diplomacy between enemy states. Cues are made through diplomatic decisions,
such as votes in organizations or state visits by certain nations, or much subtler, such as odd
wording in a letter between leaders. Ensuring the message is accurate and the correct actions are
made provide an immense challenge for both sides. The foreign policy decision making
apparatus must be capable of adapting to these sorts of informal messages as well as replying
appropriately. How these systems adapt provides the influence on perceptions of another state. In
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some cases, these sorts of back-door approaches are critical to preventing or encouraging a major
conflict.
The following chapters will examine the cases of the rise of the United States against the
hegemony of the United Kingdom, the attempted transition attempt by Germany against the
United States, and the potential transition of China against the hegemon of the United States. The
factors outlined here will provide theoretical support to an adapted form of power transition
theory that does not assume a violent transition between great powers.
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Chapter 2

-

Peaceful and Violent Transitions

The extremes of history provide the basis of more moderate events. The peaceful hegemonic
transition between the United States and the U nited Kingdom is defined by a series of seemingly
unrelated events that shifted American perceptions and ultimately led to a deep diplomatic
friendship. Utilizing the framework developed i n the prior chapter, this case highlights the role
institutional actors provide in shifting perceptions as well as the dynamics required for peaceful
transitions.
The violent attempted transition of the Second World War will be explored through the
origins of the conflict, namely the events within Germany from 1 9 18 - 1 939. Since these events
alone would have likely instigated a formal conflict regardless of leadership composition, this
section will primarily focus on the role of personality on the shape and direction of hegemonic
conflicts.
PEACEFUL TRANSITION: THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE UNITED STATES
Relations between the U nited States and the United Kingdom4 emerged with a strong
sense of hostility caused by the violent nature of American independence, unclear borders, and
belligerence of key actors. These issues were only exasperated by the development of an
American sense of uniqueness with a self-seen sphere of influence in South America as well as a
highly reactive public and free press. Over a period of twenty years, the threat of war between
the two nations transitioned into a close-knit alliance. This transformation in relations has raised
fundamental questions of the basis of international relations.

4 Before 180 I, the nation was known as the Kingdom ofGreat Britain. Following the Acts of Union in 1800, the
nation was known as the United Kingdom ofGreat Britain and lreland. This thesis focuses its study on times
covering both states. To limit confusion, this thesis utilizes the shortened name of"United Kingdom".
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Realist theory points to the gradual increase of American material power relative to the
U nited Kingdom (O'Brien & Pigman, 1 992) while liberal international theory note the increase
in free trade that lead to formal interdependence. Other scholars argued that the British
Parliament was pressured into settling border disputes with the United States by internal business
interests due to the raw physical potential of development within the American west (Merk,
1 934).
Each of these theories does not explain the peaceful nature of the great power shift that
occurred. Utilizing the framework developed in the previous chapter, this section argues for a
mutual gradual shift of perceptions between the U nited States and the U nited Kingdom. Trust
was gained once border delineations were agreed upon and the American political system
stabilized. The American role in the world was gradually expanded through mutual discussions
over critical issues and finally British acquiescence over the American hegemony in Latin
America.
BASELINE RELATIONS - NEGATIVE VIBES

Beginning with the American struggle for independence, early relations between the
United States and the United Kingdom were outright hostile. While the movement was
ultimately successful, most serious issues between the states were not resolved with the 1783
Treaty of Paris. Neither side necessarily followed the treaty, with individual American states
refusing to return British property seized in the war and the British military building additional
fortifications in the relinquished territories west of the Appalachians.
While these initial issues were resolved with the later Jay Treaty ( 1 794), American
political discourse developed into how best to approach European affairs, especially the
continuing conflicts between France and Britain. Over time, the American political system
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decided to remain neutral towards European affairs in order to maintain a free trade system with
as many states as possible.
The British attempted to control the growth of their independent colonies by limiting
their trade with Revolutionary France. boarding American merchant ships and seizing their
sailors, as well as sponsoring Native American raids on American settlements i n the ceded
territory east of the M ississippi River. These actions infuriated the American public to the point
of declaring war in 18125.
The war concluded with the American perception of victory despite no actual territorial
changes. The Treaty of Ghent was plagued with the same problems as the 1783 Treaty of Paris
and failed to settle substantive differences in shipping rights, territorial control within Oregon. as
well as border issues on the northern end of the Louisiana territory (Bourne. 1967).
Negative perceptions from both sides prevented any significant progress towards a
general peace. The foreign policies of the two states were focused on \\hich power should
control the continent. While the British worked to block American expansion. the Americans
pushed heavily for development of their newly acquired territories of Louisiana and the
Northwest Territory. Through shrewd political maneuvering, the United States continued to

5 The war itself was relative minor in composition due to the ongoing Napoleonic Wars. This is probably lucky for

the infant American state. as a complete focus on the conflict by the United Kingdom would likely have collapsed
the United States. See Latimer

(2007) and Stagg (2012) for a thorough histol) of the conflict.
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expand rapidly. This steady expansion and the failed British attempts to stop them formed the
basis of American mythology.
THE MYTHOLOGY OF THE EARLY UNITED STATES- GO WEST, YOUNG MAN

The War of 1 8 1 2 created a sense of strong American patriotism. The relatively peaceful
years following this war led to the settlement of the western territories as well as the formation of
a strong American mythos that bound the new nation together. The key feature of this mythos
was the concept of American exceptional ism which was rooted in the notions of manifest destiny
and the Monroe Doctrine. Each of these was instrumental in defining the American superpower
i n its later years.
Manifest destiny argued that the expansion of the United States to the Pacific coast was
divinely predestined, and the movement was characterized by a religious zeal towards the
positive sense of American values and the reshaping of the west to fit these values (Stephanson,
1996). While this was heavily disputed in American political discourse (Merk & Merk, 1963, p.
144- 1 56), the concept promoted the annexation of a vast portion of then-Mexico and half of the
Oregon Territory through military conquest or threat thereof.
The Monroe Doctrine was written in 1823 by US Secretary of State John Quincy Adams
and defined American foreign policy through the Cold War. Under the policy, the United States
would be the protector of the newly independent states of Latin America and would block any
further colonization by European powers. This was an attempt by the early American
government to create a sphere of influence against Europe. While functionally impossible to
maintain with the weak American military, it nonetheless gave the United States leeway to
conduct foreign policy that was popular with the public. Britain also had a vested interest in
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keeping other European powers out of Latin America to maintain their system of free trade that
did not rely on direct colonization (Herring, 2008, p. 1 53-1 55).
This mythes was the basis of strong tensions between the U nited States and Great Britain.
Left alone, conflict was inevitable between these two poorly-connected, bickering, and stubborn
nations. Within the power transition framework, the United States had a very negative
impression of British use of force as well as its role in the system. It was considered a backwater
by Britain and utilized force to ensure its interests. While the United States was weak, this was a
viable option, but when it grew in power it became more difficult to do so.
Through the latter part of the I 91h Century, the relations between the two states
normalized. Thjs process was two-stepped. Borders were formally delineated between British
Canada and the expanding United States through a negotiation mechanism. This was followed by
a mutually beneficial trade arrangement that fueled the American industrial revolution.
BORDER DELINEATION CONFLICT RESOLUTION- OREGON AND TEXAS

Clear border delineations are critical to establishing a stable relationship between
neighboring states. Unclear boundaries based on vague treaties or uncharted territories create
tension when a natural resource is discovered nearby. Border claims tend to stretch from one
extreme to the next, and settlements will always meet somewhere between those extremes
(Simmons, 2005).
The westward expansion of the United States and its steadily increasing legitimacy and
economic power in the 1 840s provides an excellent case study. Border delineation negotiations
between British Canada and the U nited States along the Oregon territory allowed for the creation
of a mechanism that resolved later crises. This mechanism fostered the development of a
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stabilization of relations in the 1 890s known as the Great Rapprochement (Perkins, 1 968;
Campbell, l 974; Jones & Rakestraw, l 997) and eventually Jed to a hegemonic power transition.
The Oregon Question rose to American consciousness during the early 1 840s, spurred by
a sweeping Manifest Destiny and the presidential campaign of James Polk, which argued for
strong integration of Texas and a hard push to consolidate American control of the Pacific coast
(Merry, 2009). Oregon was jointly occupied by the British and Americans through an 1 8 1 8
treaty, but a northern border of American influence was never established. Negotiations of the
issue took place over twenty years and were stalled by political maneuvering within Congress,
diplomatic disputes within Britain, accidental deaths of key players, as well as a distracting
Texan independence movement.
The timing of this question was not coincidental. Regional power in the far northern
territories of Mexico was weak and the region of Texas aimed for independence. Whether it
would fall under American or British influence would detennine the eventual fate of the modern
southwest, especially the city of San Francisco (Bourne, 1 967, p. 1 2 1 ).
The feverish push that defined the American political culture at the time was met with a
lukewann reception from the British government. With British troops, trading forts, and citizens
finnly implanted in the Oregon region, the British were capable and had a level of willingness to
declare war over the issue (Cramer, 1 963, p. 3 7 1 ; Matzke, 200 1 ). Despite this willingness,
British internal discussions indicated that the territory of California would be a valuable
negotiating chip on the border issue in Oregon (Merk, 1 967, p. 394-40 1 ).
Certain diplomats nonetheless worked to avoid the possibility. President John Tyler
( 1841 - 1 845) utilized Edward Everett, the American ambassador to Britain, to negotiate with the
British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Lord Aberdeen. The Americans offered
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functionally the border that exists today: a straight line along the 49th Parallel with an enclave to
allow the entirety of Vancouver Island to remain British (Jones & Rakestraw, 1 997, p. 1 84- I 85).
The agreement never reached an official status due to the boisterous nature of Congress.
Strong rhetoric and legislation in favor of a large swath of territory reaching 54° 40' N was
introduced by a bloc within Congress (p. 186). Senators argued that the current arrangement of
peaceful joint use of the territory was the only item preventing full scale conflict (p. 1 87). Cooler
heads managed to avoid sparking a war, with the British ambassador concluding it was directed
to the public for electioneering.
By 1 84 l , the British ambassador Richard Pakenham was determined to negotiate with a
willing partner. The Texan struggle for independence distracted American political institutions
away from the Oregon issue. Secretary of State John Calhoun as well as the Tyler Administration
believed that the British were intent on maintaining an independent Texas free of slavery and
open to free trade. They argued that if supposed British intrigue succeeded, there would be war.
Congressmen accused Pakenham as using the Oregon issue as a ruse to distract the American
public from Texas (p. 1 88). This issue led to a deep distrust by the British ambassador and
threatened to undermine a peaceful resolution of the Oregon issue.
Following the annexation of Texas in 1 845, another push occurred to rapidly consolidate
the vast western territories of the American continent. Settlers set off in vast numbers to colonize
the region through the now-famous Oregon Trail. Congress passed legislation that built forts and
settlements along the route. At the same time, the British navy was expanding to counter a threat
from the French but also to prepare for a possible conflict with their former American colonies.
The election of the strongly pro-expansionist Democrat James Polk led to a British fear that
negotiations would never occur in earnest.
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The British found themselves in an untenable position. On the one side, the British public
was emboldened by the American rhetoric over Oregon and wanted war. On the other, a plank in
the ruling Democratic Party platform was focused on lowering tariffs to British goods. Any
derail on Oregon would risk this beneficial business arrangement. In addition, the French were
split between supporting their American allies and maintaining the status quo with Britain.
Despite these serious issues, a degree of honor was brought into the process with British leaders
being verbally disgraced by their American counterparts and calling for conflict to restore a
sense of honor. These opinions were not universal. British negotiators Pakenham and Aberdeen
believed a peaceful settlement could be found (p. 2 1 0). Understanding the negotiating
background in this light shows the British were much more open to negotiations that would not
entirely exclude them from the region. The only item preventing successful negotiation was the
lack of a viable American partner.
The stubbornness of the Polk Administration ( 1 845-1 849) was met with an incredibly
frustrated new Peel government. The British foreign policy under Peel was based on several
distinct points. At the time, the British were averse to gaining additional colonial territories to
focus on economic gains (Matzke, 200 I , 20). They also believed that overwhelming naval power
could ensure a stable system that produced free trade (p. 22). As for the United States, the British
were comfortable with a sectionalist political system that produced little more than heavy
rhetoric and compromises on serious issues. Trade with the nation was also of vital importance
due to the vast territories controlled by the United States and access to raw materials. These
interests laid the groundwork for British reaction to internal American politics.
The Polk Administration was simply unwilling to compromise on the Oregon issue. After
rejecting a compromise offer from the British with an arbitration agreement, he appointed several
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of his most vocal supporters of the 54° 40' line to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as
well as maintaining his bellicose language during a State of the Union address (Merk, 1934;
Jones & Rakestraw, 1 997, p. 201-214). Being rebuffed at every level gave Peel little to negotiate
over. He increased naval spending and dispatched a naval vessel to "peacefully" visit the
Columbia River (Matzke, 200 I , p. 33). He also threatened to accede to the bloc in Parliament
willing to declare war with the backing of the British public (Merk, 1 934).
By 1 846, the new American ambassador Louis McLane delivered this change in policy to
the dismay of the Polk White House. The United States was unprepared for a conflict with the
world's preeminent naval power, and a moderate bloc within Congress reacted by blocking any
push to war by extremists. Polk himself became more moderate and argued that free trade
between the two states would be beneficial (Jones & Rakestraw, 1997, p. 243). The British
believed that the strong show of force encouraged a compromise position to develop within the
United States as well as appease the British public similarly engrossed in war fever (Jones &
Vinson, 1953; Matzke, 200 1 , p. 37).
This moderation on its own was not enough to encourage a swift resolution. By early
1 846, an American conflict with Mexico over the still-undefined border with Texas seemed
inevitable, which gave Polk strong pressure to wrap up one crisis to focus on the other. In a
period of two days, the political situation radically changed. The Oregon joint-occupation
agreement was voided on 23 April 1 846 and negotiations began formally over the new border.
The first battles of the Mexican-American War were fought on 25 April. The pressures of this
war ensured swift passage of the treaty after it became clear that stretching the negotiation out
would result in the possibility of British support to the failing Mexican military (Jones &
Rakestraw, 1 997, p. 262).
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The formal treaty was signed on 15 June 1846 and gave the Americans the exact line on
the 49th Parallel the British had rejected initially. The British policy of naval containment placed
pressure on the American government, but it was a direct nationalistic conflict over the southern
border that forced the Americans to act or risk a formal containment by British troops in both
Oregon and Mexico.
While the role of domestic political pressures was important for the proper mechanisms
of policy change, the broader concept that fueled this change was the frustration of British
leadership to messy American democracy. Their perceptions towards the Americans were mostly
as errant children unable to control their impulses (Bourne, 1967; Campbell 1974). The British
public were outraged by the brash language utilized by the Americans. Instead of focusing the
issue on the broader foreign policy debate, the British government utilized an economic
argument expounding upon the benefits of free trade and the relative worthlessness of the
antiquated fur system (Merk, 1932; 1934). In combination with the politically unpopular repeal
of the Corn Laws, this treaty also benefited the internal British political climate, as it opened
peaceful access to western Canada for free trade and avoided a costly conflict (James & Lake,
1999). It was a firm compromise for both sides. The resolution of the boundary dispute without
bloodshed proved to the United Kingdom that the excesses of American democracy could be
moderated by institutions and wise leadership. This win-win situation was the continuation of the
British trend to pursue mutually satisfactory resolutions, which is what allowed them to remain a
hegemonic leader for decades.
Despite this apparent policy victory for the British, the Americans came out much
stronger militarily and diplomatically. They obtained Texas, much of the modern southwest and
northwest, San Francisco, and Puget Sound. Even more effectively, the victory over Mexico
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highlighted British acquiescence towards American hegemony over North America (Bourne,
967, p. 170-1 73).
The resolution of the Oregon Question established the framework for settling of future
policy disputes. Britain would continue to pursue win-win scenarios while America would
continue to rise in economic power and political clout. The process of negotiation forced the
British to contend with a demagogic political class that was tuned to the moment and not to
grand diplomacy. The only way the British could gain peaceful relations and maintain free trade
was to compromise and work to build a professional network instead of relying on rhetoric. To
this end, later British governments would utilize key individuals chosen for their connections in
American government to determine the intentions of the American politician. Once these
intentions are known, crises can be avoided or resolved peacefully (Glasner, et al. 2015).
PERCEPTION SHIFT- TRADE POLICY

The border resolution began the process towards shifting perceptions by the rising power
towards the United Kingdom. Once seen as an antagonistic enemy of American independence,
American views began to see them as a viable trading partner, unwilling to interfere with a
sphere of influence in Latin and South America. At the same time, British policy shifted to
accept the American state as an expanding power. The British goals against the United States
were originally to contain its expansion westward as well as develop deep trading ties to placate
the government. The Americans resisted at every point to ensure independence. Over time, both
sides realized the containment policy established during the colonial period was ineffective due
to a combination of steady American economic growth as well as British internal political shifts.
The political interdependence of the two states grew to include a reciprocal free trade
system over several decades. Prior to this system, a complicated network of tariffs on imported
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goods regulated the prices for items only produced in a select region or secrets of a
manufacturing technique. This system encouraged a mercantilist process of trade that saw a
circular trading regime. Starting in 1 820, Britain slowly began moving towards a more open
system with limited reductions in tariffs (Stein, 1 984, p. 36 1 ) .
This created a problem for revenue due to Britain's reliance on fees to fund government
systems. Other countries, including the United States, were also unwilling to lower their tariffs to
encourage free trade (Cain & Hopkins, 1980). This led to a large trade deficit that was filled by
British capital into the early industrializing United States (Stein, 1 894). This infusion forced
cooperation between the two nations and heavily influenced the developmental pace of America
(Brayer, 1 949).
The American reaction to this shift was very positive. Instead of a strong colonial power,
they began to see Britain as a solid partner for free trade that was committed towards a mutually
beneficial policy of economic development. A rapid development of the interior of the expanded
nation was the market where British steel and machinery would find its biggest share which only
strengthened ties. The only remaining step to ensuring peace was the development of a new role
for the U nited States in the world.
This shift was the first step to creating a peaceful hegemonic transition. The British
reliance on tariffs for governmental income prevented flexibility in foreign policy. Once Britain
was firmly entangled in the American economy, they were bound by its economic obligations to
remove any obstacles to American growth. Due to this, American foreign policy became bolder
and began to rub against the interests of Britain.
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PERCEPTION Sf!IFT- I895 VENEZUELA BORDER CRISIS

New international orders are developed over time through a confluence of events and
policies that eventually shift global orders, even if it is accomplished through a massive conflict.
While trade and economic considerations were vital in shifting perceptions about the hegemon·s
actions. the establishment of a new role for a rising power as well as its satisfaction with this role
is critical for peace.
The new role can be explored through a border dispute between the newly independent
state of Venezuela and the British Colony of Guyana in 1895. This crisis nearly saw a formal war
until the United States unilaterally moved in as an arbitrator under the Monroe Doctrine. The
implications of British acquiescence to American involvement highlight the sphere of influence
promoted by a more powerful and relatively unrestrained American military as well as British
acceptance of a slowly shifting global order.
The dispute began with a vague border established between the Spanish and the Dutch
colonies on the South American shore. When the Dutch ceded Guyana to Britain in 1 8 14, the
border issue remained unresolved due to lack of settlements and inaccurate surveys. After the
failure of negotiations in 1 8 87. Britain declared their claim to be final and Venezuela severed
relations. Both sides established military checkpoints within the disputed region and the threat of
war was constant.
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The repeated calls for American involvement by Venezuela went unanswered until they
utilized a former American ambassador William L. Scruggs to petition the American Congress.
He produced a pamphlet arguing the British aggression was violating the Monroe Doctrine and
pushed for legislation to counter the threat. A resolution (H. Res. 252; 53rd Congress) calling on
arbitration of the border dispute was introduced by a friendly congressman and became policy by
a unanimous vote by both houses and signed by President Cleveland on 22 February 1895.
In May, the Nicaraguan crisis caused an American outrage over the heavy use of British
military force so near to the United States6. Secretary of State Richard Olney sent a letter to
Parliament that argued the border arbitration should be resolved peacefully and with American
assistance under the logic of the Monroe Doctrine claiming that "today the United States is
practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines
its interposition" (Herring, 2008, p. 307). The British were outraged by the broad interpretation
of American superiority in the Western Hemisphere and considered the commission a threat of
possible conflict if they did not acquiesce (Gelber, 1 966, p. 3). President Cleveland pushed the
issue by establishing a commission to study the boundary dispute under the assumption the
region was under the American sphere of influence and European activities were limited by
American power.
The strong increase in war rhetoric simply backfired on Cleveland. Every major actor
outside of the Administration was strongly opposed to these moves. The press ridiculed the idea,
the business community was enraged, and his own Democratic Party allies stood opposed to it.
In a similar sense, the British also did not wish for conflict over a minor border dispute. A large
membership in Parliament moved to ensure arbitration (Zakaria, 1 998, p. 1 5 1 ) An agreement
.

6 See LaFeber ( 1998), 2 1 8-29 for a study of the Nicaraguan crisis in American foreign policy. Also see Bourne
( 1967) p 181-185 for the British perspective.
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was reached in November l 896 settling the border dispute and establishing an arbitration panel
that eventually ruled heavily in favor of Britain.
This episode highlights the lengths the United States was willing to take to ensure a
broader more powerful role in the world. By threatening war with the hegemon at the perceived
height of its power, despite their interconnectivity, the Americans highlighted their need to be
involved in regional affairs. The reaction to counter this move on both sides of the Atlantic
highlights the distinct shift in perceptions.
By the 1 890s it was clear that the United States was a global power economically due to
its underdeveloped interior and relative lack of population. Relative to the rest of the world, the
United States surpassed every other state in every measure of production. Paul Kennedy argued
that the United States "seemed to have all the economic advantages which some of the other
powers possessed in part but none of the disadvantages" (Kennedy, I 987, p. 20 I ) .
Despite its growth, its military and diplomatic corps were minuscule following the Civil
War. This was a result of the intentionally designed decentralization of the American
government (Zakaria, 2008, p. 55). While the president was considered in charge of foreign
relations, Congress controlled the development of formal policy and the fiscal resources to
handle diplomacy. This led to an ambivalent foreign policy that didn't favor any particular side
unless the public demanded a response. In affairs generally outside the boundary of American
interest, foreign policy was limited to the whims of Congressional oversight. Essentially, the
weakness of this system benefited the Jong-term stabi l ity of the American state. lt avoided
unnecessary conflicts, limited alliance entanglements, and brought a stable relationship with
Great Britain. Once the bureaucracy was professionalized and the State Department became the
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focal point for diplomacy7, the United States could define its role in the world as a quiet
hegemon through the early 201h Century.
The peaceful development of the American hegemon against an established power is
nonetheless odd in history (Kupchan, 200 I). Its relative isolation. abundant natural resources.
and democratic system allowed it to avoid foreign entanglements while promoting an
expansionist agenda. The I 91h Century American foreign policy decision-making apparatus
heavily utilized back channels lo ensure that domestic rabble rousing did not turn into formal
conflict. This was accomplished through proper diplomats or special envoys as low-level
individuals would be unable to gain access and proper internalional instilutions did not exist.
Eventually. a win-win scenario was constructed to allow both sides to save face when making
serious compromises. This process repeated itself multiple times until both sides were
comfortable acting outside of their governments' wishes to ensure peaceful relations.
This process changed after the professionalization of American foreign policy decisionmaking. Proper diplomatic channels were opened and ambassadors were exchanged with nearly
ever} nation. Congress was mostly cut out of the process and the President became the foreign
policy implementer with the Secretary of State as the chief diplomat. This allowed for more
formal discussions and cemented the friendly relations bet\veen two great powers.

7

The nuances ofthis change are well outside the purview of this thesis. See Zakaria ( 1998) p. 48-55 for a solid

overviev
...
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VIOLENT TRANSITION: GERMANY'S FAlLED HEGEMONIC TRANSITION
The clearest example of a modern hegemonic war is the case of the Second World War.
Germany rose from the ashes of a humiliating military defeat to fight an even bloodier war
against its perceived enemies: The United States and the United Kingdom. This section will
focus on the slow shift away from any possibility of peaceful relations with its neighbors through
the enforcement of the Treaty of Versailles, the resulting economic crisis and lack of relief
granted, the slow rise of Nazism, and the war that Adolf Hitler created. The war itself will not be
analyzed directly as the minutia of Germany's eventual loss is well-tread. In the presented
framework, it is the origins of the hegemonic transition attempt that are important.
The War emerged from the firmly negative perceptions of the German leadership towards
the post-Great War global order that was designed to prevent German development of industry
and expansion of trade. France in particular wished to avoid a powerful German state. Hitler's
ability to increase economic capacity and militarization gave an opening for Europe to
reintegrate Germany into the overarching system peacefully with only mild territorial
concessions. This section argues that the closed autocratic system within Nazi Germany defined
by Hitler himself prevented these attempts from succeeding. War was likely following
Versailles, but the scope and direction of the war was directly shaped by the perceptions and
philosophy of Hitler. His philosophy prevented any form of accommodation with the hegemonic
order and forced the hegemon to destroy the violent rising power. Unlike the previous section,
there will be no shifts in the adapted transition framework. The only actors that could have
prevented an attempted violent transition did not have the decision-making capacity to
accomplish it.
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This section will proceed as follows. First there will be a discussion of the historical
background of the German state and how the Treaty of Versailles motivated a shift towards
authoritarian dictatorship. This will be followed by a description of the political dynamics of the
Weimar Republic that led to a consolidation of power by the NDSAP. Following this will be an
analysis of Hitler's political philosophy and personality in order to demonstrate that there was no
chance of peace under a Hitler-led Germany.
BACKGROUND OF THE GERMAN WORLD WAR

Founded formally in 1 87 1 , Germany was a powerful empire emerging from the ashes of
the Holy Roman Empire. It maintained strong central leadership with an effective and efficient
bureaucracy. With the competent leadership of Bismarck, it developed a delicate balancing
system that avoided major European war for decades. Despite these efforts, the system collapsed
and the Great War destroyed the German Empire in 1 9 1 8. Germany emerged from the Great War
humiliated and weakened. Its government was reformed into an ineffectual pacifist republic and
its people bound to economic reparations to the victors.
The treat) that dictated terms to the Germans was signed in Versailles in 1 9 1 8. It was
universally regarded as harsh towards Germany (Boemeke, et al. I 998). It limited the physical
number of troops, airplanes, and naval ships that Germany could produce, demilitarized the
border region along the Rhine. confiscated all overseas colonies, forced the transport of several
industrial factories to France, and forced a series of repayments to the victorious allies. Outside
of the obvious impact of the loss of economic capacity, the treaty humiliated the German people.
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A constitution was adopted in 1 9 1 9 in the city of Weimar. It established a proportional
parliamentary system with a popularly elected head of state. The democratic parties gained
plenty of support, but the heterogeneous nature of the German state ensured numerous outlier
parties would have support within the system (Friedrich, 1933). At every point through the
political history of this republic, the major political parties slowly pushed the state back towards
authoritarianism, as only a weak coalition could govern the state effectively8. The internal debate
was focused on the slow repudiation and possible renegotiation of the Versailles Treaty.
Economically, the government was unable to quickly react to the economic depression
that swept the world in the 1 920s and ultimately the reparation system collapsed9. Politically, the
system was stymied by a multi-party system that rarely formed a stable government and
eventually was overtaken by radicalism. Culturally, the German people were familiar with
democratic processes (Anderson, 2000) and understood the balance between efficiency and
freedom. They nonetheless desired a stronger government to match the relatively strong state that
existed (Anderson, 2000, p. 400-415).
THE STRUCTURE AND FAILURE OF WEIMAR

The Weimar republic was a system forced upon the public as a way of eliminating the
influence of elites within Germany and Prussia (Anderson, 2000). It was designed around a
parliament (the Reichstag) with proportional representations and maintained a popularly elected
president that acted as head of state. The president was reliant upon a stable majority in the
Reichstag to act outside of emergency procedures under Article 48 10•

8

See Hiden ( 1 996) for an excellent history ofthe collapse ofthe Weimar system.

9 The nuances of the economic slump are analyzed in a variety of economic texts, especially James ( 1 986).
10

Article 48 allowed the president to act outside ofthe authority of the Reichstag under emergency circumstances.

These orders were countersigned by the Reich Chancellor who acted as the head of government and

was

accountable

to the Reichstag. Before Hitler, it was utilized heavily to ensure the stability of the state in extraordinary economic
conditions. Of note, Hitler gained dictatorial powers through Article 48 and emergency laws passed by President
Hindenburg. The Weimar constitution still existed and functioned through the war.
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The democratic parties were split between the SPD (center-left) Zentrum (also called
Centre), DDP (progressives), and DVP (liberals). Two primary coalitions developed over time,
but their ineffectiveness gave rise to the extremists who sought to eliminate the republic. The
country had a strong fascist movement (NSDAP) as well as an equally powerful communist
movement (KPD). As with most communist movements, infighting was common, and it was
never able to find an electoral path that allowed it many seats i n the Reichstag (Hiden, 1 996 p.
63-8). Fascists always had stable leadership and a commanding voice in Adolf Hitler. Its support
slowly rose over time and eventually resulted in the end of the Weimar system.
This highlights the historical divide that existed in the German Empire between socialism
and the democratic conservatives and liberals. Every party had a very narrow interest to serve
and acted in a majority only with certain issues. Each vote was comprised of differing majorities.
This was an inefficient system yet only two governments faltered under a no-confidence vote
(Hiden, 1 996, p. 86).
Much like modem federal systems, different regions maintained local administrative
systems, called Lander. These regions maintained control over education, judicial systems and
the police forces (Hiden, 1 996, p. 8 1 -2). While Reich laws maintained precedence, the semi
independence of the Lander allowed for a more stable administrative body so the chaos in the
Reichstag did not spread to the public.
The government maintained regularly scheduled elections, but due to the nature of the
coalition-reliant Reichstag, snap elections were held regularly. I n its fourteen-year life, there
were eight elections. Table I 0 shows the results from each election until the National Socialist
seizure of power in 1 933. Out of these elections rose twenty-one differing governments between
1 920 and 1930 and very few received approval to govern from the Reichstag (Hiden, 1 996, p.
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Table I 0: German Parliamentary Election Results, 1 9 1 9-1933
Election

SPD

Centre

DDP

DNVP

19 January 1 9 1 9

37.90%

19.70%

1 8.60%

10.30%

6 June 1920

2 1 .70%

1 3.60%

8.30%

1 5 . 1 0%

24 May 1924

20.50%

1 3 .40%

5.70%

7 December 1924

26.00%

1 3.60%

20 May 1 928

29.80%

1 2 . 1 0%

1 4 September 1930

24.53%

3 1 July 1932
6

November

1932

5 March 1933

Source: NohIen &

KPD

NSDAP

19.50%

10.50%

6.50%

6.30%

20.50%

3.60%

3.50%

4.80%

14.20%

10.60%

2.60%

1 1 .8 1 %

7.03%

1 3 . 1 3%

18.25%

21 .58%

12.44%

5.91%

14.32%

37.27%

20.43%

1 1 .93%

8.34%

1 6.86%

33.09%

18.25%

1 1 .25%

7.97%

1 2.32%

43.91%

Stover (20 I 0).

8 1 ).
The economic instability of 1 923 caused a fundamental transformation of Weimar
politics. A massive inflationary process was forcefully ended through massive government
intervention (James, 1 986), the public began to distrust the government's ability to manage
foreign affairs (Childers, 1983, p. 263), and the membership of political parties began to shift
away from traditional democratic ideals towards the reactionary concepts promoted by the
communists and fascists (Broszat, 1981 ; Childers, 1983). Hit Ier found support in most every
social category, including the former middle class, the blue-collar worker, the retired classes, and
even large portions of the established cultural elite (Childers, 1983, p. 264-266). Despite this
broad support, the expectations of economic security and national prestige could never be
accomplished during an electoral cycle. The NSDAP position was electorally untenable, which
forced consolidation of power in 1933.
Ultimately, the nature of the National Socialist movement was to ensure that the public
was continuously motivated to act against a perceived threat (Hiden, 1 996, p. 77-79). While this
threat originally was against the ineffective Weimar governmental bureaucracy and their
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economic policies, it soon turned towards a racial hatred of the Jewish population. This
successful strategy was heavily motivated by the opinions and philosophies of one man.
ADOLF HITLER

Adolf Hitler became Chancellor through political pressure and parliamentary trickery
(Broszat, 1 98 1 , p. 57-96). The passage of the Enabling Act in 1 933 eliminated the effectiveness
of the democratically elected Reichstag and allowed Hitler himself to authorize laws under the
emergency powers listed in the Weimar constitution. Over time, the bureaucracy fell to his
influence with the steady replacement of opposition members with National Socialist supporters
(Broszat, 198 l , p. 97-132). Despite the slow march towards consolidation of power, the primary
tool to ensure compliance of the population was through the rhetorical power of Adolf Hitler.
Hitler's mannerisms, rhetoric, and policy positions were the driving force behind the
conflict and its eventual course (Bullock, 1 99 1 ; Kershaw, 1 998). His early views were focused
on the apparent role of the Jewish people to cause a German military defeat (Weinberg, 1 995, p
32). He believed that these forces controlled the Weimar republic and would be rooted out by a
nationalist population. This conspiratorial Social Darwinist philosophy continued into his general
speeches when arguing that recent immigrant groups were only diluting the racially superior
Germans that held out against the outside forces (p. 33).
The second category of Hitler's philosophy was based on geographic space. A large
amount of German territory was annexed by its neighbors to limit its industrial capacity. In
Hitler's philosophy, this limited the ability of the German state to maintain its culture and self
sufficiency. He also believed war was a justifiable policy rather than a last resort (Weinberg,
1995, p. 37; Bullock, 1 99 1 p. J 76). Hitler justified this attitude with the public's disgust for the
Treaty of Versailles (Bullock, 1 99 1 , p. 1 73; Hitler, 1 926).
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He also firmly opposed communism and liberalism. Only by focusing the entire
population towards ensuring the stability of the state, he was able to eliminate any rivals to his
dictatorship. The leadership of the various parties fled to other nations or were eliminated
through political assassination while democratic levers of power were slowly turned over to
Hitler himself (Broszat, 198 l , p. 294-327). He became the focal point of all governmental
function. He became the Third Reich.
APPEASEMENTAND CONLFICT

Once Hitler was in power, his rhetoric unsettled the European powers. Policies emerged
to renege on certain treaty stipulations including allowing the rearmament of the Rhine region,
negotiating over German ownership of the Sudetenland, and tolerating the merging with Austria.
The European powers, especially France and England, strongly opposed these moves, but
understood the need for substantive changes in Germany to avoid outright war. The British
Prime Minister from 1 937-1 940, Neville Chamberlain, was especially vocal on these points
(Gilbert & Gott, 1963). He believed the rise of Hitler to be a logical reaction to the combination
of the Great Depression and the harsh terms of Versailles. To this end, he was willing to
compromise with the Germans on a multitude of issues.
The success of these policies only increased Hitler's confidence and his support within
the German public. With domestic politics completely under National Socialist control, he
shifted his rhetoric against the communists. Hitler saw the greatest threat from the Soviet Union
(Hiden, 1 996, p. 227-3 1). He believed the nation was founded by a Jewish conspiracy and it
would act against German expansionism in the Balkans.
Hitler had no negative intentions towards the British system and wished to ensure
neutrality during a war against the common communist threat (Hughes, 1 988, p. 290). The only
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way to ensure this neutrality was through bilateral negotiations. To avoid meddling from other
Allies, he withdrew Germany from the League of Nations and ignored international conferences
on disarmament. This poor maneuvering by Hitler only led to British hostility. The lack of
multilateral institutional involvement led to the general lack of communications as well as a
cloud of uncertainty over the intentions of both Britain and Germany.
During this time, the United States remained firmly neutral in international affairs. As
previously established, it was a quiet hegemon who would have to have its public motivated to
fight the threat of fascism in both Asia and Europe. The American public was sympathetic to the
German cause prior to Hitler, but were surprised when the system collapsed into a dictatorship
(Weinburg, 1 995, p. 1 82). Hitler saw the United States as a powerful adversary that would be
drawn into the war eventually and motivated the public to stand opposed to outside aggression
by the United States (Hildebrand, 1973, p. 2 1 ). The American government under Franklin
Roosevelt knew the dangers of Hitler and understood his intentions clearly, yet were unwilling to
involve themselves unless directly attacked (Weinburg, 1 995, p. 1 87). This gave Hitler enough
reason to ignore the American threat until he was ready to strike.
Ultimately, the NSDAP failed to secure a hegemonic victory against the combined might
of the American-British military. This was entirely due to the consolidation of German power
into one individual. As the ultimate gatekeeper, Hitler was unable to maintain a balanced broad
policy agenda that could accomplish his goals. His sheer hatred of his enemies ensured that no
opposition to his whims would exist. His resentment towards foreign powers ensured no peace
could occur. His diplomatic gestures backfired, and he had no knowledge of the intentions of his
possible enemies. This case highlighted the violent type of hegemonic transition, but it also
showed that not all hegemonic transition attempts will be successful.
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COMMENTS AND ANALYSIS
This chapter has highlighted the extreme examples of hegemonic transitions: entirely
peaceful and fully violent. Each case fits well within traditional power transition literature as
defined by Organski (1958), but the theory alone is not sufficient to explain the peaceful nature
of the American transition. This chapter has demonstrated that perceptions do fundamentally
affect the violence level of historical transition attempts.
Organski argued that British acceptance was due to American support of the British
French system (DiCicco & Levy, 1999, p. 688 footnote 36). This thesis argued that American
acceptance of a European system was unsustainable to the fiercely independent American pubI ic.
It required a fundamental shift in perceptions to ensure any level of peaceful interaction. This
involved a sustained effort on the part of the American foreign policy decision-making system.
The European powers attempted a similar approach with the rise of Nazi Germany, but it failed
due to the uncooperative processes built into the regime as well as the equally stubborn
philosophy of its leader.
The ideas of Organski ( l 958), Organski and Kugler (1980), and DiCicco and Levy
(1999) appear to be mostly correct. The adaptations developed by this thesis provide additional
clarity to the nuances of the transition process. The evidence provided by historical examples
allows for a more accurate analysis of the likely future case of the transition from the United
States of America towards the People's Republic of China, which will be demonstrated in the
following chapter.
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Chapter 3

-

The Rise of China and the Future of American Hegemony

The previous chapters have established the baselines for violence levels of hegemonic
transitions. This chapter will describe the process in which the People's Republic of China (PRC)
will become the global hegemon by the end of the century following a steady decline of
American power. The process is not likely to be entirely peaceful as Sino-American relations are
stressed by several complicated issues.
A violent transition is not desired by either nation. Nonetheless, a rising power is capable
of initiating violent action if the hegemon is unwilling to compromise. The internal political
system of the PRC is based on Communist Party-centric leadership guiding the heavily regulated
economy and military. While the consumeristic behavior of the United States currently fuels the
PRC economy, a slowly rising middle class has begun to shift the interests of the Politburo.
These changes will change the behavior of the government and allow greater flexibility in
foreign policy decision-making. The PRC is only interested in maintaining the economic and
political independence of the country as well as continuing to expand its geopolitical interests in
the region.
The United States currently has economic, military, and cultural supremacy over all other
nations, much like Britain in the late I 9th Century. Unlike Britain, it has built a system of
international organizations that ensure its stability and compliance from deviant actors. The
United Nations, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and World Trade Organization all
assist in American hegemony.
The election of Donald Trump to the American Presidency has ignited a debate on
America's role in the world. The American foreign policy establishment has been blindsided with
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wild rambling inconsistent and inflammatory statements of its commander in chief1 1 • A large
number of critical posts remain unfilled within the State Department and the diplomatic corps.
The administration has also eliminated the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal, reneged on the
Iran nuclear deal (JCPOA), began implementing tariffs on certain imports, began renegotiation
over the North American Free Trade Act, and withdrew from the Paris Climate Accords.
Despite these changes, the United States is in a strong economic, military, and social
standing. While one man cannot destroy a hegemon from the inside, the fact that such a man can
be freely elected and allowed to continue this charade of competence indicates to China and the
rest of the world that the United States is truly beginning to falter on its own. This provides an
opening for a steadily rising power to assume more responsibility on the world stage. China has
begun the process of a similar trade deal to the Trans-Pacific Partnershi p with a focus on Chinese
trade, has founded and expanded an alternative to the World Bank, and is taking large steps
towards ensuring compliance with the Paris Accord's climate change requirements. It appears to
be slowly setting up an alternative system and taking initiatives on issues that the United States is
leaving behind.
This thesis argues that the PRC is generally pleased with the system and the role the
United States is playing, yet it stands in the way of broader ambitions. Therefore, assuming there
are not any accidents of history, the rise of the PRC will be generally peaceful as they seek to
provide an adaptive transition. The structure will not change, but the leader will.
This chapter will utilize the framework developed to show that the Chinese government
is aiming to work within the current global system to benefit its long-term development and
resolve geopolitical issues in its favor. This will culminate in the resolution of long-

1 1 For numerous examples updated nearly daily, see https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump
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standing issues including the status of Taiwan, a North Korean peace deal, settlement of
delineation of the South China Sea, formation of a solid intellectual property regime, and a
normalization of human rights issues.
The remainder of the chapter will proceed with a brief history of the Chinese civilization
focused on its hegemonic role in the region as well as modern interpretations of this role. Then
there will be an analysis of the current foreign policy decision making structure within China and
its attitudes on foreign policy. This will be followed by a discussion of the public statements and
policies made by the Chinese government. This will all be connected into an analysis of the
current geopolitical issues facing the Sino-American relationship.
HISTORICAL NORMS
Chinese historical norms are rooted in three interconnected factors: the sheer length of its
histol), the cyclical nature of its stability, and the centralization of China to the culture of the
region. Recorded Chinese history began with the Xia Dynasty (2030-1600 BC) and gradually
developed into more sophisticated cultures under the Shang ( 1600-1 046 BC) and lhou ( I 046256 BC) Dynasties. The Zhou Dynasty saw the development of the Mandate of Heaven, which
grants legitimacy to the Chinese leadership 12• Over time, the semi-feudal system began to
collapse as various military leaders began to vie for regional control. Known as the Spring and

12

The Mandate of Heaven was based upon the concept of"heaven·· controlling natural forces and will ofthe
universe. If an unfortunate series of natural disasters would occur, riots would develop and overthrow the ruler, as
the people felt the will of the heavens was lost. See Mingming (2012) for a nuanced discussion.
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Autumn Period (722-476 BC), this period saw the development of traditional Chinese
philosophies, including Confucianism, Taoism, and Legalism.
Slowly, the collapsed states began to coalesce into several large states that began to
compete for complete dominance. This chaotic period is aptly called the Warring States period
(476-221 BC) and saw the advancement of mathematics. Ultimately, the states were combined
into the Qin Dynasty (22 1-207 BC) by Ying Zheng. He settled much of central China into a
cohesive empire under the Legalist system. He also utilized a bureaucratic structure that
eventually developed into the imperial examination system, which emphasized individual
excellence in calligraphy and general knowledge of the Imperial Chinese structure 1 3•
This stability remained through the Han Dynasty (202 BC-220 AD). China expanded
through military conquest while mathematics and trade flourished on the Silk Road. Ultimately, a
series of foreign invasions, natural disasters, and economic collapse shattered the system with a
series of short-lived dynasties until an eventual consolidation under the Tang Dynasty (61 8-907).
This time is considered the pinnacle of Chinese civilization (Hucker, 1975, p. 1 39-147). Massive
population growth occurred due to the relatively equal distribution of land, fair military
conscription system, and economic connectivity with the world. Once again, the system
collapsed with a series of rebellions and small dynasties until the relative peace under the Song
Dynasty (960- 1 279) was ended by the Mongol invasions.
When the Chinese were rid of the Mongol influence, the Ming Dynasty ( 1 368-1644)
turned inward and became xenophobic to any external influence. The state regressed into
agrarian society and the government became much more authoritarian, yet maintained a strong
bureaucracy stubbornly opposed to change. These factors as well as the general weakness of the

13 A fascinating book on the subject is found in Elman (2000).
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military resulted in a successful Manchu takeover of China. This Qing Dynasty ( l 644- 1 9 1 1 ) was
the final dynasty before the subjugation of the Chinese by the West and was noted for corruption,
ineffective governance, and resistance to Western influence at any cost (Hucker, 1975).
Europe established a republican form of government upon China in 1 9 1 2. The central
government was never able to fully control the entire country. A variety of warlords, rebellious
groups, and an insurgent communist front formed and waged a series of wars against each other
and the central government. Japan made aggressive moves into the region with an invasion of
Manchuria in 1 93 1 and towards the whole nation in 1937. By 1950, the communists had taken
full control over the country and established the People's Republic of China which still exists.
Ultimately, the history of China can be shown in a series of cycles with a consolidation of
power under a single state, a stagnant rule, internal rebellion, and reformation into a series of
minor states struggling to reform into the whole. There were few, if any, outside nations to
interfere or invade Chinese territories. If they did exist, they were considered barbarians and not
recognized outside of their ability to pay tribute to the empire (Dikotter, 2015). The Chinese
culture was based on a centralized philosophy and common language. The emperor retained sole
authority under the Mandate of Heaven and conflict only erupted when this authority was
challenged. This is in deep contrast to the concepts developed within Europe. After the fall of the
Roman Empire, nation states developed with distinct languages, cultures, and philosophies.
Conflict was inherent between these states on historical claims of land or personal grudge.
PHILOSOPHIES GUIDING THE CHINESE STATE
The foundation of Chinese decision-making is based upon its need for independence from
all outside factors (Steinberg & O'Hanlon, 2014). The leadership has primarily focused upon the
supremacy of the ruling Communist Party, developing economic strength, and ensuring historical
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territorial sovereignty. This is accomplished through traditional values supplemented with the
concepts developed by modern communist philosophers.
China has been governed by three competing philosophies: Confucianism, Legalism, and
Taoism. Taoism considers human action to be contrary to nature (Lao Zi, Book II, 48).
Governments should do as little as possible to interfere with the natural order of humanity.
Confucianism pushes for the opposite. They believe that all of society is structured into a
hierarchy under the order of the heavens (Mingming, 2012). This concept developed into the
complicated role of the Mandate of Heaven within Chinese society. Government must be careful
to ensure careful social order to avoid retribution from above.
Legalism expands upon these philosophies into a positive philosophical and legal
framework. All laws must be developed to apply equally to all within society. These laws reward
positive behavior while punishing negative behavior. The hierarchy of the Confucianists can be
corruptible when the powerful behave poorly with no consequences (Weng, 1996, p. 334). As
such, the individual has no place within society other than as a subject of the law. Individuals
work towards the best interests of the whole or, in particular, the state and its apparatus (Kane,
200 I , p. 48).
While Imperial China utilized Confucianism extensively, the modern Communist state
utilizes Legalism (Weng, 1 996, p. 336). The modem variant developed by the PRC eliminates
the individual entirely. The state is thus superior to and must control the individual's purpose and
role within society. The state is not abstract as it is i n the Western system. The concept of the
state has developed in terms of particular institutions, and individuals measure their effectiveness
in terms of social order and how well the public is mobilized (Kane, 200 l , p. 48).
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The functions of the state are thus functional rather than philosophical. Morality and
idealism is beyond the purposes of the state. Social order and general productivity are considered
important in the philosophies of both the traditional Legalists as well as the current PRC
government (Wing-Tsit Chan, 1 963, p. 252-257). The PRC has entrusted the Communist Party
apparatus to ensuring social order through ideological consistency and productivity through
massive projects such as the Three Gorges Dam and the economic development program 14 • This
is summed up with the full quote associated with Mao Zedong's truism: "Political power grows
out of the barrel of a gun. Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun wi II
never be allowed to command the Party."
Other leaders have continued this sentiment. While Deng Xiaoping radically shifted the
economic and political framework of the PRC, he still focused heavily on ensuring Communist
rule. He defined the Four Cardinal Principles: The Socialist road, the dictatorship of the
Proletariat, the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong
Thought. Each of these emphasize or support Party leadership (Kane, 200 I , p. 48). Every leader
since Deng has emphasized the role of Communism within government 15 • Even Xi Jinping has
supported the continual role of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism in ensuring Chinese independence
from outside influences, namely capitalism (Xi, 2014, p. 27-33).
The distinct policies that the PRC pursues are based on a series of statements and policies
developed over decades. The most important of these are the Five Principles of Peaceful

14 Historically, the Chinese state has utilized these sorts of projects to maintain social order. The Great Wall and the

Grand Canal arejust two examples ofthe massive ancient projects that maintained imperial rule.

1 5 Deng Xiaoping: "If China does not hold up socialism, it will be turned into an appendage ofthe capitalist

countries." (Whiting, 1995) Jiang: "In other words, peaceful evolution and bourgeois liberalization are aimed at not
only overthrowing our socialist system but, fundamentally, at depriving us of our national independence and state
sovereignty." (Whiting, 1995) Xi: "In the whole history of mankind, no nation or state has been able to rise to power
and rejuvenate itself by relying solely on external forces or blindly following others; doing so inevitably leads to
failure or subservience." (Xi, 2014).
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Coexistence signed between the PRC and India in 1 954. Chinese foreign relations will pursue
that mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression,
mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and cooperation for mutual
benefit, and peaceful coexistence. These statements build upon the vested interests of the PRC
regime.
Everything done by the PRC is done to ensure the stability and growth of the PRC.
Economic reforms ensure economic stability and wealth, political reforms ensure public support
of the regime, and philosophy is utilized to educate the public as to the rightness of the state.
Foreign policy is utilized as the direct tool in this battle of independence. The legalist structure of
Chinese philosophy and its Marxist adaptation leads to a simple conclusion that Chinese foreign
policy decision making will continue to maintain a logical approach that ensures independence
and growth of the Chinese state.
CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING STRUCTURE
Xi Jinping, the current president of China, has managed to transform the state to suit his
will 16• His philosophy has been placed into the CCP's charter, his anti-corruption regime has
eliminated political rivals, and his rhetoric is becoming the new guiding principles of the Chinese
state. Despite these powerful statements, he still must deal with the bureaucracy that maintains
his rule.
Foreign policy in China is developed under a complicated bureaucratic system that
involves agents within the Communist Party and academic communities. Unlike economic
matters or domestic policies, foreign policy has not been decentralized (Xuanli, 2006, p. 1 5).

16

Xi's rise to power is covered by Ramzy (2018) while his style of government is covered by Economy (20 14) and
He & Feng (2013).
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While many actors are involved, it is a close-knit group that fully decides how China is to
approach the world 1 7•
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MLA) is the body that is responsible for diplomacy and
officially implementing decided foreign policy. It is composed of several subdivisions that focus
on specialized areas such as external regions, internal management, and consular departments
(Lu, 2000, p. 26-7).
The People's Liberation Army (PLA) is the armed forces of the Chinese government.
They maintain the security of the mainland as well as ensure popular compliance to the
Communist government. The PLA maintains strict subordination to the CCP and has little
influence in the decision-making of foreign policy (Segal, 1981 ).
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is ingrained in every level of government. Leaders
are high ranking members and ideological purity is paramount. Following the separation of
formal decision-making powers in the early 1 980s, the CCP dealt only with high level policy
discussions and did not manage routine diplomatic issues, though their influence is evident
regardless.
Outside of the two powerhouses of policy implementation, the Politburo is the leadership
body of the Chinese state. It is composed of CCP members who have earned a position with past
endeavors. The Politburo itself is sub-composed of working groups and various committees that
are formed as needed. The most vital of these is the Standing Committee which functions as the
true leadership of the Politburo. Currently, it is composed of seven members ranked in order of
protocol. Outside of official meetings, members of this committee do not communicate with one

17 The closeness of these groups is defined by the concept of"Guanxi". See Gold, Guthrie, and Wank (2002), for a
detailed analysis of how the interpersonal network system functions within Chinese society and government.
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12:

Rank
15'

5th

Chinese Politburo StandingCommittee Membership, 2017
Name

Positions Held

Roles

Xi Jinping

President ofthe PRC, Chairman ofthe PRC Central
Military Commission, General Secretary of the CPC
Central Committee, Leader of the Central Leading
Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reform,
Chairman of the National Security Commission

Li Keqiang

Premier ofthe State Council of the PRC, Party
Secretary of the State Council, Deputy Leader ofthe
Central Leading Group for Comprehensively
Deepening Reform, Vice Chairman of the National
Security Commission

Li Zhanshu

Party Secretary ofthe Standing Committee of the
National People's Congress, Chairman of the
Standing Committee of the National People's
Congress

Foreign Affairs, personal
liaison to Xi on foreign
trips

Wang Yang

Party Secretary of the Chinese People's Political
Consultative Conference, Chairman of the Chinese
People's Political Consultative Conference, Vice
Premier ofthe State Council of the PRC

Backer of economic
reforms (Guangdong
model); emphasis on non
profits and trade unions

Wang
Huning

Secretary of the Central Secretariat of the CPC

Political theorist: foreign
policy leader; assisted in
policy that allowed
entrepreneurs, capitalists,
and intellectuals in the
CCP

Zhao Leji

Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline
Inspection

Economic guru: former
upper position in the
Organization Dept.

Han Zheng

Vice Party Secretary of the State Council of the PRC, Former Shanghai mayor,
lead city's modern
First Vice Premier of the State Council of the PRC
transformation

"Paramount Leader";
ultimate veto point; no
political rivals

Maintains daily affairs of

the government

Source: Scott et al (2017).

another (Lu, 2000, p. 38). All foreign policy emerges from this committee and is implemented by
organizations below them.
Like most major nations, no leader is knowledgeable on all subjects. While democracies
utilize public academies and numerous staffers, the authoritarian government utilizes think tanks
of a different sort. Chinese think tanks are semi-autonomous groups of experts that act as
academic-style research institutions and produce policy analysis (G. E., 201 4). Think tanks
provide evidence and arguments to break ties between differing institutions (Scobell & Cozad,
2014). If they come to a conclusion different than the Politburo, the policy idea quietly ends.
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Table l 3 : Limited Listing of Important Chinese Foreign PolicyThink Tanks

Name

SupportingAgency

Personnel

Influence Area

China Institute of
Contemporary lnt'I
Relations (CIClR)

Foreign Affairs Leading
Group (Standing Committee);
Ministry of State Security

China Institute of Int' I
Studies (CllS)

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Chinese Academy of
Social Sciences (CASS)

State Council; CPC
Propaganda Dept.

-180

Academic background for
leadership

China Institute for lnt'I
Strategic Studies (CllSS)

Non-governmental; deep
connection to PLA

-30

Military issues, general
policy concepts

Shanghai Academy of
Social Science (SAAS}

Shanghai local government;
MFA

-80

Policy issues in broader
language

-400

90

-

Public influence and
relations, leadership
advisory
Internal MFA advisory

Information compi led through Abb (20 13) and XuanIi (2006).

They are subordinate to the bureaucratic organization in which they are under but allow for open
debate in a contained environment that will not affect the broader civic culture. Think tanks can
also be based in an academic setting, entirely private, or completely enclosed by government
bureaucracy.
Chinese think tanks are different than the Western counterpart. Instead of remaining
independent, most think tanks within China are controlled by individual government agencies:
their membership and role are mostly unknown to outside observers (Xuan Ii, 2006, p. 69-99).
Table 1 3 provides a list of notable think tanks. They are influential due to a combination of
expert membership, administrative support, and personal ties between government members and
leaders of the think tanks (Zhu, 2009).
There is debate over the role of think tanks in China. Some argue they are simply
metaphorical holding bins for intellectuals (Ming-Chen & Stone, 2004), while others have
suggested the

intellectuals in think tanks are given a level of independence that is sorely lacking

from Chinese civil society (Tanner, 2002). They are capable of providing opinions on substantive
policy issues without fear of reprisal so long as they do not spread the opinions to the general
public.
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Table 14: Influential Behaviors of China's Think Tanks based on the Social Structure Paradigm
Social Structure
Literal
Nonliteral
Decision-maker

Research reports, policy

Hearings, accrediting experts,

(nucleus) influence

consulting research report, and

consultative seminars on policy.

regular internal reference

and government lectures

Social elite (center)

Academic journal articles, issue

Attend academic conferences, hold

influence

academic periodicals, and

Public (periphery)
influence

academic conferences, training,

publications

and large-enterprise consultation

Publish media articles, other

Ac<:ept TV, websites, newspaper

research results quoted by

interviews, and do talk shows

media, and create websites
Source: Zhu, X.

(2013). The Rise o/Think Tanks in China. New York:

Routledge, p. 96.

Their arguments are only effective if they are able to influence the administration. Zhu
argues that Chinese think tank influence can be measured through three distinct social structures:
the nucleus, the center, and the periphery (Zhu, 2013, p. 96). Zhu's framework encompasses the
more commonly utilized tools of think tanks as modes of influence. These are split between
formal and informal influences. The nucleus is the decision-making elite that are influenced
formally through research reports and policy consultations as well as informally through hearings
and lectures. The center is composed of the social elite that are influenced by academic journals
and other publications and informally through conferences. The periphery is the general public
influenced through general media and websites. The nuances of this framework are shown in
Table 14.
The influence of the think tanks is driven in a cyclical pattern. The decision-making elite
direct the think tanks to investigate a particular policy option. Once formulated, it is reported
back to the decision-makers as well as integrated into presentations for the social elite. If the
decision-makers do not adopt the suggestion, it survives with the social elite which then
influence the decision-makers on later issues.
Truly measuring the independence of think tanks is difficult (Dror, 1984; Luo, 1 99 1 ;
Hamrin & Zhao, 1995; Lu, 2000; Glasner & Saunders, 2002; Xuanli, 2006; Feng, 2007; Zhu &
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Xue, 2007). Think tanks may be acting collaboratively in order to spread a policy idea elsewhere
or it could simply be an effort to expand the analysis in an academic environment not hampered
by political considerations.
The policy implementation process is simple. Information is placed into a central
repository. Think tanks take this infonnation and fonnulate a series of competing policy ideas to
present to the upper leadership. Through deliberate debate and a series of meetings, a final policy
is decided. This idea is thus sent back through the bureaucracy with instructions as to how best to
accomplish these tasks decided by each department. Should policy implementation
disagreements occur, the same deliberate debate and series of meetings ensures compliance with
the policy.
ISSUES FACING THE FUTURE OF CHINA-US RELATIONS
The foreign policy decision making system must contend with a list of serious issues
most notably the independence of Taiwan, South China Sea delineation, Korean nuclear efforts,
intellectual property issues, and human rights considerations. The way in which the PRC
resolves these issues will determine the level of violence in the likely future hegemonic
transition. Ultimately, they will have to be resolved regardless or the PRC will be unable to move
beyond relatively minor internal debates and handle serious broader concerns. Each issue will be
discussed with a brief history of the issue, the stances of the various actors, and the likely
resolution. intellectual property and human rights are based on internal issues yet do affect
outside relations. These sections will focus on how the internal structure of the PRC is adapting
to maintain positive relations externally.
The issue of Taiwan has been a focal point of Chinese foreign policy since the cessation
of hostilities between the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the People's Republic of China in
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1 949. Taiwan represents the remnants of the previous government of the mainland and still

claims its original territory. Relations between the two are based on the One-China Policy. This
policy eliminates diplomatic relations with any state that recognizes one over the other. There are
eighteen nations who currently recognize the ROC and dozens maintain an informal relationship
out of pragmatic necessity. While Taiwan debates their role internally (Wang, 2000), the PRC has
consistently maintained a hard line on full integration (Yahuda, 1 996).
The status quo is likely to maintain until one actor develops enough trust to shift the
stalemate. This will likely be accelerated should the United States begin to limit its support of the
status quo. A much stronger PRC and a weaker United States would likely force an American
withdrawal from the region at some point. Should this be a peaceful withdrawal, a peaceful
resolution would be possible. Neither the Americans, Taiwanese, or the Chinese wishes a
military confrontation as both Taiwan and a sizable portion of mainland China would be
devastated through traditional warfare.
The likely end result would nonetheless involve a massive process of trust-building and
cooperation on a variety of issues between Taiwan and the PRC. At some point, the PRC would
open direct communication with Taiwan, thus recognizing it on the international stage. In
exchange, the PRC would insist on the ending of the American alliance and a limited form of
membership within the PRC as a special administrative region, similar to Hong Kong. Taiwan
would agree only because of the ineffective American military might in the region as well as the
likely ambivalent objections to such a maneuver. Ultimately, the PRC would integrate Taiwan
under subtle threat of outright invasion or economic ruin through a blockade that no international
actor could functionally oppose.
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An American war would be the next likely scenario. lf China maintains its hostile stance,
the Taiwan Strait would be the last location abandoned by the waning American military.
Chinese invasion attempts would be met with a devastating conventional military strike by the
American alliance system. Depending on how far the conflict extends, the end result could be
thennonuclear warfare. Ultimately, China would not pursue this path unless forced.
The other scenario is incredibly unlikely but nonetheless possible. ft would involve heavy
negotiation between the island and the mainland with neutral third parties ensuring
implementation of any agreement. In exchange for the complete withdrawal of the United States
from the area and a ban on anns sales to Taiwan, China would recognize the island as
independent. Taiwan for its part would drop any territorial claims and disann all offensive
capabilities and then recognize the mainland government. This is a wildly optimistic scenario
that is unlikely to occur, especially with Chinese insistence on the settlement of the issue in their
favor.
The delineation of the South China Sea is a matter of territorial integrity for China as
wel I as a matter of national security (Scott, 2012). The region contains an unknown amount of
petroleum reserves and due to its position, several nations including Vietnam, The Philippines,
Malaysia, and Brunei have made claims under various international norms. The PRC has
disproportionately claimed a territory much larger than any other nation. The Chinese justify
their claim based on a historic line drawn in 1 947 (Zou, 1 999). The line has been justified with
the construction and militarization of artificial islands throughout the region (Watkins, 2015).
International law in this area is defined by the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea. Ratified in 1 982, it defines economic claims on the ocean as extending for 200 nautical
miles from land. Despite the clearness of the law, China has refused to accept decisions made by
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international institutions. Since China has veto power within the UN Security Council, it can
block any attempt by that body to act i n the region. The International Court of Justice has
decided a case against Chinese claims, but the country refuses to accept the decision (Phillips,
2016). The Law of the Sea is similarly impractical as political considerations that tend to

outweigh the practical application of the law (Burgess, 2003). The United States has attempted to
settle the issue within a variety of regional forums structured around the Association of South
East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 18 system. These have been also blocked by China due to its distrust
of the United States. China sees the dispute as between individual states and wishes to settle
them in a bilateral fashion through regional institutions.
ASEAN agreed upon a code of conduct for the South China Sea in 2002. The
organization recognized the Law of the Sea while promoting cooperation with navigation,
combating transnational crime, and environmental protection. It urged all signatories to exercise
self-restraint in matters that would increase tensions and to agree peacefully i n a bilateral or
multilateral fashion to settle border disputes. Several scholars see the deal as a positive first step
to settling the disputes in the region (Fravel, 20 1 1 ; Thayer, 20 1 1 ; Womack, 20 l I).
The purpose of this agreement was two-fold. first was to centralize pressure on China to
avoid damaging bilateral relations with the PRC. The second was to force the PRC into living up
to its statements promoting peaceful coexistence. If it failed to do so, the organization would
increase its military pressures, especially with outside American assistance (Lee, 2005). Despite
the historical success of such an approach, China has not changed its behavior over the South
China Sea.

18
The Members of ASEAN include Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam with two observer states ofTimor-Leste and Papua New Guinea. The
Organization has extended relationships with ASEAN Plus Three: People's Republic ofChina, Japan, and South
Korea; and the East Asia Summit with India, Australia, New Zealand, the United States, and Russia.
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The problem with diplomacy in the South China Sea is due to a perceived link to national
security (Scott, 2012). By discussing areas that do not touch on national security or sovereignty,
diplomatic efforts have been incredibly successful. China and regional partners utilize Track 2
diplomacy 19 for most of their discussions. Elite interactions build trust and foster cooperation,
especially on issues like environmental concerns and safe navigation (Weissman, 2009). These
Track 2 efforts have led to substantive discussions in Track l forums, including ASEAN. These
discussions are limited due to the nature of ASEAN as being a forum for discussion rather than

19 A solid introduction to the Track system of international negotiation can be found in Diamond & McDonald

( 1996) and Fisher (2006).
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for resolution (Swanstrom, 1 999). Nonetheless, nothing substantive has been agreed upon since
China appears to be unwilling to compromise with their stated goals. China's consistent policy
on border delineations has been to focus upon bilateral discussions (Weissman, 2009; Scott,
201 2). Any other attempts provide a facade of dialogue in favor of substantive discussion.
Vietnam's policy on the islands have been consistently opposite that of China. Since a
normalization of relations with the Land Border Treaty ( 1 999) and the Gulf of Tonkin
agreements (2000), China and Vietnam have both been competing over physical control over the
Spratly Islands. Several incidents have occurred involving cutting of Chinese undersea cables
and consistent fishing in Chinese claimed waters. Each state has fired upon fishing boats and
have made serious rhetorical threats to send out formal naval vessels or air force in response.
Since Vietnam has been unable to militarily counter China with the assistance of
ASEAN, it has begun to grow ties with the United States. The US position has been relatively
neutral over the claims but has focused primarily on regional security and stability (Scott, 2012,
p. 1030). Upon the election of Rodrigo Outerte as president of The Philippines, the steady
alliance with the US has begun to fade. Outsized language similar to Trump's rhetoric has
indicated a shift towards China on a variety of issues (Baviera, 2016). Outside of the US,
Vietnam has allied with the Philippines to counter China in the region despite the mutual
disagreements over sovereignty of islands.
The Philippines has a similar history of friction with China. After initial agreements of
joint petroleum exploration and development between state oil companies expired, a general
deterioration in relations led to increased tensions and military modernization. This
modernization includes upgrading a valuable airstrip on one of the Spratly Islands as well as an
increase in naval capabilities. At every step, China has continued to dispute the legality of the
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claims made by other states and has called American involvement in the region "suspicious"
(Scott, 2012, p. 1 034).
China's growing shadow in the region has the variety of other actors scrambling for
mutual assurances and alliances with outside actors to protect their claims. The harsh rhetoric
coming from China has not assisted resolution. The rhetoric has been backed by political
statements, legislation, and military actions aimed at legitimizing the claims in the South China
Sea. The state petroleum companies have also pushed for greater access to the region while the
government has attempted to block foreign deals with other states in the region (Scott, 2012, p.
I 038). Despite the increase in military might by all powers involved, direct military
confrontation will be limited by the high cost of a general war, despite the petroleum reserves
(Womack, 201 1).
China has shown the ability to delay substantive response while the historical claims can
be further legitimized and it can approach bi lateral negotiations with a greater sense of strength.
The options ahead are limited by China's reluctance to embrace them. The general approach has
been towards mutual development without discussing the sovereignty issue, but even this has
failed in the short term. Track 2 conferences have seen the greatest success and theories exist to
validate the concept a being a necessary step to greater cooperation as it socializes the elites to
one another. Under this, scientific research, environmental issues, and marine safety including
combating piracy and illegal trade seem to be relatively easy issues to cooperate on.
Unfortunately, so long as the power balance remains relatively equal between the US-regional
state alliances and China, the most common prediction is towards the maintenance of the status
quo.
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Should China become more powerful and develop closer ties with its neighbors, a
resolution of the situation would be forced upon the region either militarily or through economic
pressure. Without American involvement, the PRC would be able to negotiate a bilateral solution
with individual neighbors to its net benefit.
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has maintained a nuclear arsenal
for more than a decade yet has only recently managed to place them onto warheads. A rouge
nuclear state is incredibly destabilizing to the region, especially if Chinese influence cannot
counteract the newly assertive regime of Kim Jong-Un. Despite these moves, the 201 8 Winter
Olympics in Pyeongchang created an opening for diplomatic maneuvers by the Kim regime
including a likely meeting between the Korean governments. President Trump accepted an
invitation for a potential meeting between the two leaders and China has seen a renewed
willingness to negotiate from its once loyal ally.
Despite these maneuvers, it is unlikely Kim will eliminate his nuclear weapons under any
circumstances. Strategically, the nuclear arsenal allows the regime to negotiate on the same level
as the United States and prevent preemptive invasions. The situation on the peninsula has been
stagnant for nearly seventy years with periodic thaws in relations. These diplomatic efforts have
faltered in the past, so any optimism should be set aside.
The goals of diplomacy are not to ensure a nuclear-free Korean peninsula but to pressure
the ROK into strategically aligning with the PRC. The ROK should highly consider the
opportunity as American involvement in the region will slowly diminish over time with a
combination of PRC pressure and the eventual deaths of all involved in the Cold War strategic
logic that maintained American troops in ROK.
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The likely future in the region would involve a substantive deal that excludes the United
States completely. The ROK would likely attempt to include the US within the framework, but
political infighting and stubborn refusal to negotiate with the DPRK without nuclear elimination
would block these efforts.
Nonetheless, the utopian version of a finaJ resolution is a general opening of the DPRK
economy into a Chinese style state-economy in exchange for a limited reduction in offensive
nuclear capabilities. Under the logic, the regime's economy becomes entangled into the world
system (Keohane & Nye, 1977). China would play a key part in this negotiation. While the US
would take credit, the PRC would work behind the scenes to ensure the Kim regime agrees to
these terms under threat of complete isolation or military intervention. A hostile regime with
nuclear weapons is an unacceptable risk to global economic stability as well as the rule of the
Communist Party within the PRC.
The alternative is a full American invasion or heavy missile strike undertaken by a future
president following heavily escalation i n tension or an active use of a nuclear weapon. The PRC
would be forced to prop up the failing regime with a full invasion from the north. Should
American and Chinese troops meet within the state, a firefight is likely and a nuclear war could
occur if measures are not taken to avoid it. This alternative is not unreasonable due to the
inconsistent nature of leaders on every side of this conflict.
The Trump Administration has attempted to create a protectionist trading policy
towards China, undoing the traditional free trade norms established after the Second World War.
Depending on the final tariffs levied, the economic effects could be devastating to both
economies as well as triggering a wave of protectionism beyond the region. These moves are part
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of the continuing American retaliation towards China's inability to moderate intellectual property
theft (IPT) by domestic companies.
Intellectual property theft is a common issue among developing economies (Rapp &
Rozek, 1 990), though China's case is somewhat different. It has maintained a strong legal
framework for combatting JPT as well as implementing the Outline of the National Medium to
Long-term Plan for the Development of Science and Technology 2006-2020 which called for an
economic solution to the issue. Despite these efforts, progress has been limited and American
patience appears to be wearing thin.
China appears to be politically unwilling to implement the rhetoric it has espoused
(Lejeune, 2014, p. 700). Politically, China is a unitary state (Lieberthal & Oksenberg, 1988). It is
highly unlikely that China is not actively implementing legitimate change. As noted earlier, the
legitimacy of the Chinese state is based on how well rhetoric is implemented into substantive
policy. The PRC would be damaging internal credibility in order to avoid implementing policy
that would benefit the state and its eco·nomy in the long term (Segal, 2005). They have also
developed special bodies in which to implement the laws (Mertha, 2005).
There also might be a cultural explanation. As noted, China has maintained a long history
outside of Western legal and political thought. The concepts of the rule of law and intellectual
property remain outside of the philosophical language utilized by the PRC (Alford, 2005;
Lehman, 2006). This is not based purely within the government, proponents of this theory claim
the civilian culture maintains similar attitudes. This is supported by educational efforts developed
by the Chinese government (Lejeune. 2014 p. 705).
The PRC is also facing a structural problem. While foreign policy remains entirely
centralized, economic policy implementation has been entrusted with lower levels of government
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(Lampton & Lieberthal, 1992). Despite the legal frameworks, the lower levels of government
either have no incentive to implement them or are too corrupt to accomplish the task. Lejeune
(2014) argues that China maintains two distinct bureaucratic classes which compete for
influence. The top layer constructs the law while the lower level implements the law. Each layer
develops deeply intricate networks of allies and friendships which assist in the required
processes. This guanxi system prevents any level of checks and balances. The top layer has
aimed to eliminate this by frequently shifting the local leadership into other positions, but this
only limits accountability as well as blocking any long-term policy implementation (Lejeune,
2014, p. 708). These local officials are also eager to be promoted through any means. As they are
judged solely on economic growth, they have an incentive to maintain the IPT system.
Monitoring the implementation of the legal systems to ensure the security of external
intellectual property seems to be a high priority. Both to ensure cooperation with international
free trade efforts and to stabilize the domestic political situation through a stronger rule of law.
Ultimately, they must accomplish a full level of implementation both as a means of ensuring
internal development and to develop as a hegemonic player.
The current international norms of human rights are viewed as lacking within the PRC
(Nathan, 1 994). Its own citizens Jack a fundamental right to freedom of speech, assembly, or
press. Political dissidents are jailed or expelled from the country, and internal policy debate is
limited. Externally, China has maintained strong support of the human rights regime within
various international organizations (Primiano & Xiang, 201 6). The contradiction is a large
hinderance to the political and economic rise of the regime. While signaling support of human
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rights assists in Chinese diplomatic efforts, the lack of freedoms especially within the minority
regions of Tibet and Xinjiang provide endless ammunition for Western critics20 .
The contradiction is answered with an understanding of the internal mechanics of
Chinese policy making. As noted, independence from external influence, stability of the country,
and maintenance of communist rule are the three pillars of PRC policy. Human rights threaten all
three. Human rights are promoted heavily by Western powers. Allowing these rights interferes
with the stability of the Chinese regime as we11 as supporting representative democracy (Tao,
201 5). Ultimately, this thesis argues that Western pressure will become increasingly ineffective
with the steady rise of Chinese influence around the world.
PROCESS OF TRANSITION
The future of the American-led hegemonic system is vulnerable to outside influence. The
PRC is fully capable of ensuring its self-interest through economic expansion, diplomatic
endeavors, and cultural exportation. Its political and economic system has become a new
standard for underdeveloped nations that are unwilling to rely upon market forces or dictatorial
powers to ensure stability and development.
China is utilizing a patronage-type system wherein Chinese capital flows into
underdeveloped countries in Latin American and Africa in exchange for access to mineral and
natural resources (Alden, et al, 2008). Unlike deals with Western nations, there is no expectation
of domestic policy shifts or obligations to abide by international norms. China will not provide
the traditional public good of security and would not meet the classical definition of a hegemonic
power.

20

There is some level of Western hypocrisy in this area. Western nations tend to focus more on political and social
rights, which China is weak, and forgive democratic states with similarly poor records (Peerenboom, 2005, p. 76).
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Once this system is firmly in place and its domestic raw material needs are met, it will be
capable of matching any rival it may face in the post-American led world. India maintains a
democratic system that is mired in corruption and a massively underdeveloped economic base.
Europe is hindered by its makeup of nationalist countries. Russia is a minor power limited by its
reliance on petroleum production. Most other regions have become reliant upon American
protection and would be unable to balance against Chinese growth.
Contrasting previous transitions, the violence of a hegemonic war is unlikely in our
modern world. A combination of nuclear weapons and economic interdependence ensure a truly
horrifying war will not occur. A much more limited conventional version is more likely,
especially if the PRC moves away from its relatively nonchalant views on foreign affairs and
resolves its regional issues in a more forceful manner. With a lack of American pressure and an
increase i n Chinese hubris, anything is possible.
The spread of Chinese power must be articulated into a policy framework to ensure a
stable global transition. It will likely be based on the historic legacy of lmperial China's All
Under Heaven doctrine. This doctrine will support infrastructure development in underdeveloped
nations, promote guarantees of mutual noninterference and independence, as wel I as extend its
culture and philosophy to the world. In this enterprise, the outsiders would be coequal and issues
between them would be settled in the established international institutions. Hard international
laws would not be implemented without the ful l consent of all involved (Tao, 201 5). China will
not dictate terms to other nations. The guarantee of independence for all nations is the common
good that the PRC would be able to support.
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CONCLUSIONARY REMARKS
This thesis has proposed a perception-based model towards hegemonic power transitions.
The model has found that the future transition involving the United States of America and the
People's Republic of China will be based upon an Adaptive concept, wherein the PRC will work
within the American-led system to increase its own power and implement its policy agenda. This
is in contrast to the scholarly assumptions that a hegemonic war would occur between the two
powers. Organski ( 1 958) stated that his theory was incomplete and later authors should expand
upon his work (p. 6). This thesis bas provided a new avenue for research based upon the foreign
policy decision making literature and the perceptions of actors within these "black boxes".
Through an analysis of history, culture, foreign policy decision making structures, and external
cues of rising powers, this thesis has developed a new framework for later authors to refine or
critique.
The case of the American rise demonstrated the developmental path of peaceful relations
between the United Kingdom and the United States rooted in perception shifts. The case of the
Nazi rise highlighted the perceptual roots of the failure of Nazi appeasement. The likely case of
rising Chinese influence highlights the uncertainty of predicting the future in a changing global
environment.
Despite these difficulties, this thesis established that the Chinese policy agenda currently
focuses mostly on regional political affairs and would not pose a threat to fundamental American
interests outside of the region. The PRC primarily wishes to ensure its own domestic stabi l ity
and increase its economic development. To this end, should the United States wish to avoid a
broader conventional conflict over Korea, Taiwan, or the South China Sea, it should articulate
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these aims directly and clearly with a deep understanding of the history and the decision-making
system within the PRC.
By the end of the 2 1 51 Century, it is very likely that that PRC will either be equal to or
exceed the might of the United States, if not on the globe, in the Asia-Pacific region. Should this
occur, the PRC would still insist that it is not a hegemon in the American sense. It will move to
become the leader in international organizations. The United States would likely remain host to
most of these organizations but would not enjoy the level of influence that it enjoys presently.
Presently, the regime is content with the United States despite some complaints over its
hypocrisy on human rights and international entanglements. The American foreign policy
decision-making system would be wise to ensure that the United States will resign its powerful
position peacefully, much as Great Britain did not so long ago.
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